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A lawyer’s fee for representing a client may be
characterized as “contingent” if the lawyer’s compensation
depends in whole or part on the successful outcome of the
matter.1 Contingent fees have been a feature on the 
American legal landscape since the mid-nineteenth century.2 
Courts and proponents describe contingent fees as the “key
to the courthouse door” because they enable poor plaintiffs to 
pursue litigation they could not afford to maintain if their
lawyers charged them by the hour.3 
† Managing Director, Aon Professional Services, Overland Park, KS. J.D., Uni-
versity of Kansas. Opinions expressed here are solely those of the author.
1. See Wright v. Guy Yudin & Foster, LLP, 176 So. 3d 368, 372 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2015) (“A contingency fee arrangement occurs when a law firm does not
bill or expect payment until and unless the contingency is achieved. Contingency
fee arrangements are typically contingent upon a successful outcome.”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 35 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
2000) (“A contingent-fee contract is one providing for a fee the size or payment of
which is conditioned on some measure of the client’s success.”).
2. Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee
and Its Discontents, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 457 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Sneed v. Sneed, 681 P.2d 754, 756 (Okla. 1984) (“[C]ontingent
fees are still the poor man’s key to the courthouse door. The contingent fee system
allows persons who could not otherwise afford to assert their claims to have their
915
      
 
     
         
       
       
         
         
       
      
         
         
      
       
       
      
       
      
        
         
        
        
      
        
        
         
       
 
         
          
  
              
                 
           
          
           
        
           
         
            
           
916 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
Contingent fee agreements also benefit plaintiffs who
would never be categorized as poor—such as members of the
middle class and even people who might be labeled as
wealthy by some standards—but who would still strain in
many cases to afford significant legal fees absent a favorable
settlement or judgment out of which the fees might be paid.
Litigation is expensive no matter who you are, and an
adversary can make it more costly through time-consuming
discovery and motion practice. For that matter, clients who
can easily afford to pay lawyers by the hour benefit from
contingent fee agreements because they shift much of the 
risk of loss to the lawyer and allow the client to allocate the 
money otherwise spent on legal fees to other needs.
Contingent fees have historically been predominant in
plaintiffs’ personal injury and employment litigation. And,
again historically, lawyers charging contingent fees have 
typically practiced solo or in small firms. However, neither
the traditional view of the types of litigation for which
lawyers charge contingent fees nor the types of lawyers or
law firms charging them is reliably accurate today.
Although plaintiffs’ personal injury and employment
litigation are still fueled by contingent fees and many
plaintiffs’ lawyers practice in small firms or alone, large and
mid-sized law firms now represent clients on a contingent fee 
basis in various matters.4 Contingent fee clients may be 
day in [c]ourt.”) (footnote omitted); Philip H. Corboy, Contingency Fees: The Indi-
vidual’s Key to the Courthouse Door, LITIG., Summer 1976, at 27, 27 (offering a
historical example).
4. See David Hricik, Dear Lawyer: If You Decide It’s Not Economical to Rep-
resent Me, You Can Fire Me As Your Contingent Fee Client, but I Agree I Will Still
Owe You a Fee, 64 MERCER L. REV. 363, 364 (2012) (observing that contingent
fees are now “utilized in class actions, complex commercial litigation, patent in-
fringement suits, and other suits where the client is generally more sophisti-
cated—no longer is the contingent fee arrangement limited to solo practitioners,
small firm lawyers, and personal injury clients,” and stating that today, “sophis-
ticated clients represented by large law firms agree to representation on a con-
tingent fee basis in business litigation.”). At least one large law firm regularly
represents plaintiffs in personal injury litigation on a contingent fee basis. Julie 
       
 
        
     
     
          
        
      
       
       
       
        
       
           
     
        
      
          
        
         
       
         
       
        
       
      
         
 
              
              
            
            
 
             
      
   
           
    
              
          
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 917
major corporations with substantial resources, as well as
individuals of far more modest means.
Today, contingent fees are commonplace in intellectual
property and commercial litigation, with law firms of all sizes
utilizing them. In one well-publicized case, Wiley Rein LLP,
a large general practice firm in Washington, D.C.,
represented the plaintiff in a patent infringement action
against Research in Motion Ltd., which manufactured
BlackBerry devices.5 The case settled for $612.5 million, and
Wiley Rein received a contingent fee of more than $200
million.6 In 2015, Chicago-based general practice firm Schiff
Hardin LLP earned a contingent fee of nearly $32 million for
successfully representing The Flintkote Co. in litigation
against Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. in connection with an
asbestos settlement.7 In 2016, litigation powerhouse
Kirkland & Ellis LLP received a $70 million contingent fee
for its work recovering environmental remediation costs on
behalf of a litigation trust created to pursue claims by the
federal government and several states against two oil
companies.8 Also in 2016, global law firm K&L Gates LLP,
which represented Carnegie Mellon University in lengthy
patent litigation against Marvell Technology Group Ltd. and
Marvell Semiconductor Inc., earned a $210 million
contingent fee when the case settled for $750 million.9 
Houston-based Baker Botts LLP “posted a record year” in
Triedman, Meet the New Boss, AM. LAW., Mar. 2016, at 57, 58 (writing about a
lawyer at “very possibly the only plaintiffs [sic] personal injury group at a large
U.S. law firm”). Other law firms not normally associated with plaintiffs’ personal
injury or employment litigation will occasionally take cases in these areas on con-
tingency.
5. David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent
Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 337 (2012).
6. Id.
7. Jennifer Henderson, Chicago: A Big Settlement Pays Off, AM. LAW., June 
2016, at 62, 62.
8. Susan Beck, Kirkland’s Big Bet Pays Off, AM. LAW., Apr. 2016, at 12, 12.
9. See Julie Triedman, Too Far, Too Fast?, AM. LAW., May 2016, at 64, 64.
      
      
      
     
         
       
    
     
      
       
       
        
      
        
      
       
       
     
      
        
      
        
    
   
      
     
        
       
        
        
         
        
 
 10. Brenda S. Jeffreys, Revenue, Profits Soar at Baker Botts Amid Contin-
gency Wins, AM. LAW. (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id= 
1202778792945. 
 11. Scott Flaherty, $1 Billion for Credit Union Agency’s Litigation Counsel, 
AM. LAW., Dec. 2016, at L6, L6. 
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2016, with its revenue elevated by multiple contingent fee 
representations.10 Finally, as reported in late 2016,
Washington, D.C. litigation boutique Kellogg, Huber,
Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel earned a $506.3 million
contingent fee from representing the National Credit Union
Administration in subprime mortgage litigation against
many of the world’s largest banks.11 
There are at least two reasons that contingent fees have 
spread beyond their historical realm to practice areas such
as intellectual property and commercial litigation, and are 
now frequently charged by law firms that have traditionally
eschewed them. First, organizational clients are increasingly
seeking lawyers who will represent them on a contingent fee 
basis. These clients believe that a contingent fee aligns the 
lawyer’s interests with their own. Linking the lawyer’s
compensation to a successful outcome in a matter supposedly
encourages the lawyer—who has “skin in the game”—to be
more creative, efficient, and result-oriented than she might
be otherwise. By insisting on a contingent fee, the client also 
avoids the potentially significant expense of paying hourly
fees during the life of the case, as well as the budgeting
challenges attributable to the uncertainty and
unpredictability of litigation.
Second, large law firms are warming to contingent fee
engagements because some cases are potentially much more
lucrative on a contingent fee basis than they would be if the 
firm billed by the hour. It is also possible to structure a
contingent fee agreement so that the law firm retains much
of the economic benefit of a contingent fee while reducing the
financial risk in the event of a disappointing result. For
instance, a law firm may negotiate a hybrid fee, where the 
       
 
         
       
          
       
        
      
        
        
       
        
        
          
         
       
            
   
       
      
       
      
       
     
      
 
            
            
           
                 
             
               
        
             
           
              
        
             
           
            
             
          
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 919
firm charges the client a discounted hourly rate or a monthly
flat fee and additionally receives a percentage of the client’s
total recovery, or a percentage of the client’s recovery if the
settlement or judgment exceeds an agreed amount.12 
Contingent fees have also become a recognized form of
lawyer compensation in defense practices and some other
forms of dispute resolution, such as tax appeals. Here,
lawyers may charge “reverse” contingent fees. In litigation, a
reverse contingent fee is based on the difference between the
amount a claimant seeks from the defendant-client and the
amount ultimately obtained, whether by way of settlement,
judgment, or other award or decision. That is, a reverse
contingent fee is based on the amount of money the lawyer
representing the defendant saves her client rather than the 
amount of money a lawyer recovers for a client, as in a
traditional contingent fee arrangement.
As established, popular, or increasingly widespread as
they are, contingent fees raise numerous professional
responsibility issues. As more clients seek contingent fee
representations and as more lawyers agree to work on
contingency, a growing number of lawyers who are
unfamiliar with those issues, or who lack experience 
navigating them, will have to develop related knowledge and
12. See Steven Susser, Contingency and Referral Fees for Business Disputes:
A Primer, MICH. B.J., Nov. 2011, at 35, 36 (discussing different types of hybrid
contingent fee arrangements); N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 697 (1997) (“We 
believe a hybrid or modified contingent fee is permissible . . . as long as the total
fee is not excessive. This will usually mean that the contingency percentage will
be lower than it would be if the fee were based on a pure contingency. Whether
the hourly fee must also be reduced depends on whether the fee as a whole ex-
ceeds a reasonable fee.”); Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 518 (1996) (recognizing
the permissibility of hybrid fees, but explaining that an agreement obligating a
client to pay the greater of a reasonable contingent fee or the highest fee that
would be reasonable based on an hourly rate would be improper because the un-
certainty of collection normally would not be considered in arriving at an hourly
fee and a higher contingent fee normally would be justified due to the uncertainty
of collection); see, e.g., Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy v. Universal Paragon Corp.,
114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 781, 791–95 (Ct. App. 2010) (approving a hybrid fee agreement
that included a reduced contingent fee and a reduced hourly rate).
      
 
      
      
 
     
      
        
        
      
     
        
        
     
       
      
       
      
   
       
         
        
         
       
        
        
         
         
    
       
       
        
   
      
 
          
               
  
920 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
expertise to practice responsibly. This need is amplified by
the fact that contingent fee agreements are subject to judicial
oversight.13 
This Article aims to provide lawyers with broad
knowledge of the professional responsibility issues lurking in
contingent fee representations. It begins in Part I with a
discussion of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct most
commonly implicated in contingent fee representations and
the circumstances giving rise to related concerns. In
particular, Part I discusses clients’ right to control the
settlement of their cases and lawyers’ inability to override or
burden clients’ settlement-related decisions; the
reasonableness of contingent fees viewed from several
angles; lawyers’ alteration of fee agreements mid-
representation, perhaps changing from hourly billing to a
contingent fee or vice versa; and contingent fee
documentation and disclosure requirements.
Part II examines the reasonableness of contingent fees
in cases in which the defendant makes an early settlement
offer. It focuses on cases where (a) the defendant settles
before suit is filed or early in the litigation and the plaintiff’s
lawyer receives a contingent fee that seems disproportionate 
to the time spent on the matter; or (b) the plaintiff rejects an
early settlement offer either before or after retaining a
lawyer, and the plaintiff’s lawyer charges a contingent fee
based on a subsequent settlement or judgment that includes
the amount of the prior offer.
Part III discusses the ground rules where a lawyer
charges a contingent fee and the client is additionally
entitled to recover statutory attorneys’ fees as a prevailing
party in litigation.
Part IV surveys public entities’ ability to hire private 
13. See, e.g., Brown v. ANPAC La. Ins. Co., 2013-1375, p. 1 (La. App. 4 Cir.
2/26/14); 135 So. 3d 1192, 1193; State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 479
(R.I. 2008).
       
 
         
      
       
        
          
       
        
       
     
        
     
        
        
    
       
      
       
       
        
         
    
       
         
     
       
      
    
      
 
            
      
  
             
  
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 921
lawyers on a contingent fee basis when acting in their
sovereign capacity as parens patriae to pursue consumer
protection, eminent domain, or public nuisance litigation, or
similar actions, rather than suing as traditional plaintiffs.
When a governmental plaintiff is acting as a sovereign, its
lawyers are expected to act with the neutrality required of
those who govern, and they must avoid abusing the
government’s vast power. Although defendants and their
supporters protest the alleged corrupting influence of
contingent fees in this context,14 courts generally permit
public entities to hire contingent fee counsel to prosecute 
parens patriae actions if they take precautions to ensure that
a case is prosecuted impartially. Part IV analyzes those
precautions and related concerns.
Part V addresses the use of reverse contingent fees in
litigation. The critical inquiry in most reverse contingent fee 
cases is the reasonableness of the fee. The problem is
calculating the amount against which the client’s potential
savings—and thus any fee—will be measured. In addition to 
exploring that issue, Part V offers lawyers practical advice
on structuring reverse contingent fee agreements.
Finally, Part VI analyzes lawyers’ right to compensation
when they are representing a client under a contingent fee
agreement and the client discharges them before the 
contingency occurs. It also examines lawyers’ right to
compensation when they withdraw from representations
before earning their contingent fees.
I. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Depending on the facts, a contingent fee representation
14. See, e.g., MICHAEL M. MADDIGAN, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM,
BIG BUCKS AND LOCAL LAWYERS (2016), http://www.instituteforlegalre-
form.com/uploads/sites/1/LocalProsecutorsPaper_WebPaper.pdf (criticizing
states’ use of private contingent fee counsel to pursue parens patriae litigation on
various grounds).
      
 
        
        
       
       
        
         
       
        
        
       
         
       
       
   
         
       
       
 
            
             
          
             
             
           
            
            
       
     
          
               
          
      
     
     
     
            
922 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
may implicate a number of rules of professional conduct,15 
although four rules are regularly in play: Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.2(a), which requires a lawyer to 
“abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter”;16 
Model Rule 1.5(a), which requires all legal fees to be 
reasonable;17 Model Rule 1.5(b), which obligates a lawyer to
communicate to the client the basis or rate of any fee to be
charged, including any changes in the basis or rate of the 
fee;18 and Model Rule 1.5(c), which requires that contingent
fee representations be documented in certain ways.19 If a
lawyer tries to change the terms of a representation from a
contingent fee to another form of compensation or vice versa,
Model Rule 1.8(a), which governs business transactions with
clients, is also implicated.20 
A. Contingent Fees and Client Control of Settlement 
Decisions 
A recurring complaint about contingent fees is that they
create potential conflicts of interest between the lawyer and
the client with respect to settlement.21 For instance, the
15. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)
(“A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”); see also
Landry v. Haartz, No. 10-P-1687, 2013 WL 2436466, at *6 (Mass. App. Ct. June 
6, 2013) (stating, in a case involving a contingent fee, that “informed decisions”
within the meaning of Rule 1.4(b) “would naturally include whether to proceed
with representation on the basis of a proffered fee arrangement”); Utah Ethics
Advisory Comm., Op. 01-04 (2001) (“Under Rule 1.4(b), a law firm must explain
its fee arrangements to the extent reasonably necessary to enable the client to 
make informed decisions regarding the representation.”).
16. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
17. See id. r. 1.5(a) (stating that a lawyer “shall not make an agreement for,
charge, or collect an unreasonable fee” and listing factors to be considered in de-
termining the reasonableness of a fee).
18. Id. r. 1.5(b).
19. Id. r. 1.5(c).
20. Id. r. 1.8(a).
21. See, e.g., RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE
       
 
         
         
        
       
      
       
       
         
      
     
        
 
      
           
          
         
           
          
          
             
            
             
          
          
               
          
              
              
              
            
             
           
                
           
             
         
           
             
               
             
           
         
            
                
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 923
client may want to take a difficult case to trial while the 
lawyer would prefer to accept a settlement offer that will
assure her of a respectable fee. Alternatively, a client may
want to settle a dispute for an amount the lawyer considers
inadequate given her valuation of the matter and the fee she 
will ultimately receive if things go as she plans, so the lawyer
favors continued negotiation or litigation. Regardless, Model
Rule 1.2(a), which states that a lawyer “shall abide by a
client’s decision whether to settle a matter,”22 clearly
establishes that the decision to settle is the client’s to make— 
not the lawyer’s.23 The lawyer must defer to the client even
LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 1.5-3(b), at 196 (2017– 
2018) (“Contingent fees by their nature raise potential conflicts of interest be-
tween the attorney and client. For example, the client may wish to settle litiga-
tion while the attorney would want to press on, or vice versa.”) (footnote omitted).
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
23. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Oliver, 555 F. Supp. 2d 72, 79 (D.D.C. 2008) (stating
that a clause in a contingent fee agreement requiring the lawyer’s consent to set-
tlement violates Rule 1.2(a)); In re Grievance Proceeding, 171 F. Supp. 2d 81, 84
(D. Conn. 2001) (“Implicit in Rule 1.2(a)’s requirement that a lawyer ‘shall abide 
by a client’s decision whether to accept an offer of settlement’ is both a require-
ment to communicate all settlement offers to the client and a requirement that
the client be permitted to decide whether to accept or not to accept any such of-
fer.”); In re Lewis, 463 S.E.2d 862, 863 (Ga. 1995) (“A client who enters into a
contingent fee contract with an attorney cannot relinquish the right to decide 
whether to accept a settlement offer.”); In re Lansky, 678 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ind.
1997) (“By including in the fee agreement a provision by which the client gave up
her right to decide whether to accept an offer of settlement, the [lawyer] violated
[Indiana Rule] 1.2(a).”); Lofton v. Fairmont Specialty Ins. Mgrs., Inc., 367 S.W.3d
593, 597 (Ky. 2012) (discussing Rule 1.2(a) in connection with a fee agreement
that also obligated the lawyer to honor the client’s decision to settle); Culpepper
& Carroll, PLLC v. Cole, 2005-1136, p. 3 (La. 4/4/06), 929 So. 2d 1224, 1227 (La.
2006) (calling it “clear that the decision to accept a settlement belongs to the cli-
ent alone”); Estate of St. Martin v. Hixson, 2010–CT–00380–SCT (¶ 15), 145 So.
3d 1124, 1130 (Miss. 2014) (observing that “antisettlement” and “antitermina-
tion”clauses in a contingent fee agreement were invalid); In re Coleman, 295
S.W.3d 857, 864 (Mo. 2009) (asserting that “an attorney may not execute a con-
tract that gives the attorney the sole right to settle a case”); Davis Law Firm v.
Bates, No. 13-13-00209-CV, 2014 WL 585855, at *3 (Tex. App. Feb. 13, 2014)
(concluding that a contingent fee agreement that required the lawyer’s consent
to settlement violated the Texas version of Model Rule 1.2(a) and was unenforce-
able); State Bar of Nev. Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, For-
mal Op. 35, at 2 (2006) (stating that Rule 1.2(a) “means what it says: the decision
      
 
       
      
         
        
      
     
         
      
      
       
       
       
     
           
         
       
        
       
       
        
        
     
        
          
 
            
  
           
   
               
             
              
           
         
      
     
        
924 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
if the lawyer believes that the client is behaving
unreasonably.24 While the lawyer may counsel the client on
the wisdom of accepting or rejecting a settlement offer, or
advise the client on the pros and cons of initiating or
continuing litigation versus pursuing settlement, she may
not usurp the client’s decision-making authority.25 
Similarly, courts hold that a lawyer may not impair the 
client’s ability to make settlement decisions by structuring
the representation to allow the lawyer to withdraw, or to 
increase the cost of representation, if the client declines a
settlement offer that the lawyer believes should have been
accepted.26 Compton v. Kittleson27 is a representative case.
Nicholas Kittleson represented Danilo and Angelita
Nelvis in a lawsuit against a used car dealer, Cream Puff
Auto, for selling them a lemon.28 Kittleson represented the
Nelvises pursuant to a fee agreement which provided that he 
would receive one-third “of any amounts recovered from all
defendants plus any award of attorney fees,” but which
would automatically convert to an hourly representation at
the rate of $175 per hour “if the Nelvises ‘decide[d] to drop
the case.’”29 Although the fee agreement stated that the
Nelvises had the authority to decide whether to settle,
Kittleson also inserted a clause that provided: “If you agree
to settle this case for an amount that will pay less than
to settle belongs to the client, and may not be abrogated to the attorney in the
retainer agreement”).
24. In re Indeglia, 765 A.2d 444, 447 (R.I. 2001).
25. Id.
26. Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 970–71 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Neb.
Advisory Op., Advisory Op. 95-1, at 5 (1995) (opining that “a provision giving the 
attorney the option between a contingent fee and an hourly fee if the client ac-
cepts a settlement offer which the lawyer deems unsatisfactory is an impermis-
sible transfer of the authority of the client to the attorney”).
27. 171 P.3d 172 (Alaska 2007).
28. Id. at 173.
29. Id. at 174 (quoting the fee agreement).
       
 
           
      
        
 
       
       
         
         
         
       
      
       
      
     
     
      
      
      
         
     
        
        
       
          
       
          
           
        
 
     
     
     
     
   
   
   
     
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 925
$175.00 per hour for the time I invest, then I shall receive an
amount over and above the 33% to compensate me at the rate
of $175.00 per hour before you receive your portion of the 
settlement.”30 
Relying on Kittleson’s advice, the Nelvises rejected
Cream Puff’s $25,000 pretrial offer of judgment.31 
Unfortunately, they lost at trial and suffered a judgment
requiring them to pay costs and attorney’s fees of nearly
$100,000.32 They filed for bankruptcy protection as a result.33 
The bankruptcy trustee, Larry Compton, sued Kittleson for
legal malpractice based on his use of “the ‘convertible fee’
agreement.”34 Kittleson won summary judgment in the trial
court and Compton appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court.35 
The sole issue on appeal was whether the fee conversion
provision in the parties’ fee agreement impermissibly
burdened the Nelvises’ right to control settlement.36 The
Compton court noted that while hybrid contingent-hourly fee 
agreements are proper in some cases, they are not always
permissible, and the agreement here certainly ran afoul of
Rule 1.2(a).37 As the Compton court reasoned:
The case at bar exemplifies the tensions created by the structure of
hybrid agreements. . . . Under a pure contingent-fee agreement, the 
Nelvises would have recovered approximately $15,000 from Cream
Puff’s $25,000 offer—only slightly less than the price they paid for
the used car. But under the fee-conversion provision, Kittleson’s
fees, when calculated at the agreement’s hourly rate, exceeded the
amount of Cream Puff’s offer, leaving the Nelvises with less than
nothing: under the hybrid agreement, accepting the offer would
30. Id. (quoting the fee agreement).
31. Id. at 174–75.
32. Id. at 173.




37. Id. at 176.
      
 
       
         
         
 
         
       
        
            
        
       
      
 
      
      
        
         
        
      
       
  
         
       
        
       
        
        
      
       
     
 
       
     
   
        
           
           
   
926 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
have triggered the conversion from contingent to hourly fees, thus
obliging the Nelvises to pay Kittleson more than $30,000 in fees
while giving them only $25,000 to satisfy the new obligation.
The impact of this “fee surprise” is compounded by the 
predictable difficulty of forecasting the effects of the fee-conversion
provision. Given the number of variables involved—the merit and
strength of the client’s claims, the probable timing and size of a
settlement offer, and the work required to achieve settlement—it
seems unrealistic to expect that prospective clients like the Nelvises
would be able to appreciate the risks and benefits of the disputed
fee provision.38 
The Compton court decided that the hybrid fee 
agreement Kittleson used in the Nelvises’ representation
was prohibited by the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct
and other aspects of Alaska law because of its potential to 
impair a client’s exclusive right to accept an offer of
judgment.39 The court therefore reversed the trial court and
remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in
Compton’s favor.40 
Culpepper & Carroll, PLLC v. Cole41 is a more unusual
Rule 1.2(a) case. There, Connie Carroll retained lawyer
Bobby Culpepper to represent him in contesting his mother’s
will.42 Culpepper agreed to do so for a one-third contingent
fee.43 Culpepper negotiated a proposed settlement with the
lawyer for Cole’s mother’s estate that would have provided
Cole with property worth approximately $21,000 more than
he was entitled to receive under his mother’s will.44 
Culpepper recommended that Cole accept the settlement
38. Id. at 179 (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 180.
40. Id.
41. 2005-1136 (La. 4/4/06); 929 So. 2d 1224.
42. Id. at p. 1; 929 So. 2d at 1225.
43. Id. at p. 2; 929 So. 2d at 1226.
44. Id.
       
 
        
       
         
        
      
      
        
       
      
         
    
        
     
        
 
    
      
       
       
        
      
       
       
    
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
           
       
   
           
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 927
offer, but he declined.45 Things went downhill from there.
Culpepper refused to file suit in the matter and Cole fired
him as his lawyer.46 Cole then challenged his mother’s will
on a pro se basis, lost, and recovered nothing.47 
Culpepper sued Cole for the one-third contingent fee he
would have earned had Cole accepted the recommended
settlement, plus interest.48 Culpepper won at trial and the 
Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court
judgment.49 The appellate court found that Culpepper and
Cole had a valid contingent fee agreement, and that by not
accepting the favorable settlement that Culpepper
negotiated before his discharge, Cole deprived Culpepper of
the contingent fee he had already earned.50 Cole successfully
petitioned the Louisiana Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari.51 
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the lower
appellate court, observing that while, in hindsight, Cole 
should have settled on the terms that Culpepper negotiated,
the decision not to do so belonged to him alone.52 To hold Cole
liable for the contingent fee would dock him for exercising his
right to reject the estate’s proposed settlement.53 More
fundamentally, the Culpepper & Carroll court noted that
because Culpepper recovered nothing for Cole, he could not







51. Id. at p. 4; 929 So. 2d at 1227.
52. Id. (citing Louisiana Rule 1.2(a)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at p. 5; 929 So. 2d at 1228.
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In summary, lawyers may attempt to persuade clients
one way or the other with respect to settlement, but they may
not arrogate or unduly burden clients’ authority over
settlement. For example, a lawyer cannot provide in a
contingent fee agreement that the client will become 
obligated to pay for her services at her standard hourly rate 
if the client rejects a settlement offer she considers
reasonable,55 or if the client rejects an offer that she
recommends and the opponent later prevails.56 The chance 
that a client will make a disappointing settlement decision is
an inherent risk that a lawyer assumes when charging a
contingent fee.
B. The Reasonableness of a Contingent Fee 
Contingent fees, like all other types of legal fees, must be 
reasonable.57 This is clear from Model Rule 1.5(a), which
provides that a lawyer “shall not make an agreement for,
charge, or collect an unreasonable fee.”58 Model Rule 1.5(a)
identifies eight factors to consider when weighing the 
reasonableness of a lawyer’s fee:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of
the particular employment will preclude other employment by the 
55. Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 95-24 (1995);
N.Y.C.L.A. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 736 (2006).
56. Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 99-18 (1999).
57. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017); Town
of Mamou v. Fontenot, 2001-1622, p. 9 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/8/02); 816 So. 2d 958,
966 (quoting Davidson, Meaux, Sonnier, McElligott & Swift v. Brodhead, 613 So.
2d 1038, 1041 (La. Ct. App. 1993)); Hauptman, O’Brien, Wolf & Lathrop, P.C. v.
Turco, 735 N.W.2d 368, 374 (Neb. 2007). In addition to applicable ethics rules,
lawyers’ status as fiduciaries to their clients requires them to charge reasonable 
fees. See Cordell & Cordell, P.C. v. Gao, 771 S.E.2d 196, 200–01 (Ga. Ct. App.
2015); State ex rel. Chase Resorts, Inc. v. Campbell, 913 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995).
58. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
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lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the 
circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the 
client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.59 
No single factor controls the reasonableness of a fee.60 
Not all factors are relevant in all cases.61 Beyond any value 
that comes from facilitating possible appellate review,62 a 
court is not obliged to engage in a factor-by-factor analysis of
a disputed or requested fee.63 The weight assigned to any
particular factor depends on the facts of the case.64 
Furthermore, the Model Rule 1.5(a) factors are not
exclusive.65 Courts may consider other factors in appropriate
cases.66 
59. Id.
60. Rodriguez v. Ancona, 868 A.2d 807, 814 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005); Snider v.
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 298 P.3d 1120, 1129 (Kan. 2013); Diamond Point Plaza
Ltd. P’ship v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 929 A.2d 932, 955 (Md. 2007); Heng v.
Rotech Med. Corp., 2006 ND 176, ¶ 30, 720 N.W.2d 54, 65 (N.D. 2006).
61. Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., LLC, 969 A.2d 1080, 1088 (N.J. 2009);
In re Jardine, 289 P.3d 516, 523 (Utah 2012).
62. See Wright ex rel. Wright v. Wright, 337 S.W.3d 166, 186 (Tenn. 2011)
(“To enable appellate review, trial courts should clearly and thoroughly explain
the particular circumstances and factors supporting their determination of a rea-
sonable fee in a given case.”).
63. Berman v. Linnane, 748 N.E.2d 466, 469 (Mass. 2001).
64. McCabe v. Arcidy, 635 A.2d 446, 452 (N.H. 1993); see also In re Malone,
886 A.2d 181, 185 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
65. WiFiLand, LLP v. Hudson, 100 A.3d 450, 459 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014); Nunn
Law Office v. Rosenthal, 905 N.E.2d 513, 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); Diamond Point
Plaza Ltd. P’ship, 929 A.2d at 955; see also Twp. of W. Orange, 969 A.2d at 1088; 
In re Jardine, 289 P.3d at 523.
66. See Berman, 748 N.E.2d at 469 (quoting an earlier case listing additional
factors).
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A fee must be reasonable under the circumstances
regardless of the terms of the parties’ fee agreement.67 
Clients cannot consent to unreasonable fees.68 Lawyers
looking to recover fees or seeking fee awards bear the burden
of establishing the reasonableness of their fees.69 
Model Rule 1.5(a)(8) specifically identifies as a
reasonableness factor whether the fee in question is
contingent.70 Again, this is but one factor for a court to
consider when evaluating the reasonableness of a fee. Rule 
1.5(a)(8) does not preclude a court from considering other
factors in evaluating the reasonableness of a contingent
fee.71 
A contingent fee is not unreasonable merely because it is
large.72 There are good reasons for this rule. First, the ability
to earn a fee greater than the lawyer might receive if she 
charged by the hour compensates her for assuming the risk
that she will receive no fee if the case is lost, while, at the 
same time, largely protecting the client from out-of-pocket
67. Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP v. Orbusneich Med. Co. Ltd., BVI, No.
FSTCV136020217S, 2014 WL 1814204, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2014).
68. See In re Sinnott, 2004 VT 16, ¶ 16, 176 Vt. 596, 845 A.2d 373, 379 (Vt.
2004) (explaining that by virtue of Rule 1.5(a), “lawyers, unlike some other ser-
vice professionals, cannot charge unreasonable fees even if they are able to find
clients who will pay whatever a lawyer’s contract demands”).
69. Young v. Alden Gardens of Waterford, LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 131887, ¶
102, 30 N.E.3d 631, 656; Gold, Weems, Buser, Sues & Rundell v. Granger, 2006-
859, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/29/06); 947 So. 2d 835, 842; Bass v. Rose, 609 S.E.2d
848, 853 (W. Va. 2004).
70. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a)(8) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
71. See In re Succession of Bankston, 2002-0548, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/14/03);
844 So. 2d 61, 65 (stating that “all factors set forth under Rule 1.5 must be con-
sidered” in evaluating a contingent fee’s reasonableness).
72. Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Edib, 4 A.3d 957, 965 (Md. 2010);
Hauptman, O’Brien, Wolf & Lathrop, P.C. v. Turco, 735 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Neb.
2007).
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loss if the outcome is unfavorable.73 Put another way, the 
lawyer is entitled to premium compensation for assuming
what is in most cases the real risk of receiving no fee for her
efforts.74 Second, and relatedly, contingent fee agreements
are intended to produce generous fees in successful cases to
compensate the law firm for unsuccessful cases that generate 
no fees.75 Third, the potential to earn a substantial fee 
compensates the lawyer for the delay between the 
performance of legal services and payment for them.76 
Accordingly, a court should not comparatively evaluate the 
reasonableness of a contingent fee simply by multiplying the 
number of hours that the lawyer spent on the matter by a
reasonable hourly rate.77 
Goesel v. Boley International (H.K.) Ltd.78 is an
interesting recent case on the subject of reasonableness. A
little boy, Cole Goesel, injured his eye when a toy shattered.79 
His parents hired Williams, Bax & Saltzman, P.C. (WBS), to 
sue on his behalf.80 The retainer agreement provided that
WBS would receive one-third of any gross settlement or
judgment and the Goesels would pay all litigation expenses,
73. Angino & Rovner v. Jeffrey R. Lessin & Assocs., 131 A.3d 502, 508 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2016); Wythe II Corp. v. Stone, 342 S.W.3d 96, 103 (Tex. App. 2011)
(citing Hoover Slovacek LLP v. Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Tex. 2006)).
74. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 9.08, at 9–36
(4th ed. 2015).
75. Siraco v. Astrue, 806 F. Supp. 2d 272, 277 (D. Me. 2011); Jacobsen v. Oli-
ver, 555 F. Supp. 2d 72, 85–86 (D.D.C. 2008).
76. Hricik, supra note 4, at 368.
77. Town of Mamou v. Fontenot, 2001-1622, p. 9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/8/02); 816 
So. 2d 958, 966; see, e.g., In re Abrams & Abrams, P.A., 605 F.3d 238, 243–49 (4th
Cir. 2010) (concluding that a district court erred in reducing a 33 percent contin-
gent fee to roughly three percent by calculating the estimated hours spent by the 
plaintiff’s lawyers and multiplying them by an arbitrary hourly rate, rather than
evaluating the reasonableness of the original fee in light of its contingency, the 
award involved and the results obtained, and fee awards in similar cases).
78. 806 F.3d 414 (7th Cir. 2015).
79. Id. at 417.
80. Id.
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but the Goesels would pay nothing if there was no recovery.81 
The ensuing litigation was intense, necessitated the
employment of numerous expert witnesses, and involved
extensive discovery.82 The case settled on the eve of trial for
$687,500.83 WBS’s one-third cut of the gross settlement
amount was $229,166.67 and the case expenses totaled
$172,949.19, leaving the Goesels with $285,384.14.84 
Because Cole Goesel was a minor, the district court had to 
approve the settlement.85 Unprompted, the district court
expressed unhappiness with the situation because between
WBS’s fee and the litigation expenses, the Goesels’ “bottom
line” was just over 40 percent of the total recovery.86 
Asserting as authority “fairness and right reason,” the
district court modified the parties’ fee agreement so that the
expenses were deducted from the settlement before WBS
received its one-third share.87 The district court also refused
to count WBS’s Westlaw charges as reimbursable litigation
expenses.88 As a result of this rejiggering, WBS was awarded
fees of $174,730.47 and was reimbursed $163,308.59 for
expenses, and Cole received $349,460.94, or approximately
51 percent of the total recovery.89 WBS appealed to the
Seventh Circuit.90 
The Goesel court reviewed the district court’s decision for
81. Id.
82. Id. at 417–18.







90. Id. (noting that the Goesels declined to participate in the appeal and the 
Seventh Circuit had to appoint amicus counsel to argue in support of the district
court’s decision).
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abuse of discretion.91 Even under that highly deferential
standard, the district court’s decision could not stand. WBS’s
fee as originally agreed was objectively reasonable when
compared to the prevailing market rate, whether based on a
side-by-side comparison between the fee ultimately
recovered and the lodestar, or compared to what the client
would have been charged on a straight hourly basis.92 
Furthermore, WBS’s original fee was reasonable when
evaluated under the Rule 1.5(a) factors.93 With no
quantitative or qualitative grounds for objection, WBS’s
negotiated contingent fee could not be characterized as
unreasonable.94 The district court’s invocation of “fairness
and right reason” could not support an exercise of discretion
where there was “no argument for un fairness or wrong
reason.”95 
At bottom, the district court abused its discretion by
restructuring the parties’ fee agreement for no good reason.96 
After deciding another issue, the Goesel court reversed the
district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings consistent with the opinion.97 
91. Id. at 419.
92. Id. at 420.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 421.
95. Id. at 424.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 425. Goesel involved the reasonableness of a contingent fee in the 
representation of a minor, which raises an interesting question: should a court
evaluate the reasonableness of a contingent fee differently when the intended
beneficiary of the lawyer’s services is a minor or other incompetent person? Ab-
sent an applicable statute or court rule, the short answer is no. Wright ex rel. 
Wright v. Wright, 337 S.W.3d 166, 185 (Tenn. 2011); see, e.g., Goesel, 806 F.3d at
420–22 (discussing the reasonableness of a contingent fee in connection with a
personal injury case involving a child); In re Abrams & Abrams, P.A., 605 F.3d
238, 244–48 (4th Cir. 2010) (discussing the factors a court should consider in
evaluating the reasonableness of a contingent fee, and applying some of them in
a case involving an incompetent adult); In re Estate of Sass, 616 N.E.2d 702, 705
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (concluding that the trial judge adequately considered the 
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Although a contingent fee is not objectionable merely
because it is large, that does not mean that a substantial fee
is reasonable merely because it is contingent. A court will
generally hold a contingent fee to be unreasonable if it
exceeds the amount of the client’s recovery.98 A court may
also find a contingent fee to be unreasonable where the 
client’s recovery “was likely to be so large that the lawyer’s
fee would clearly exceed the sum appropriate to pay for [the]
services performed and risk assumed.”99 
Reasonableness concerns also surface in cases in which
it appears from the start that the defendant’s liability is
clear. In such cases there is arguably no contingency on
which to base a contingent fee. But appearances are
deceiving and assumptions along these lines are frequently
mistaken. In fact, as experienced trial lawyers and judges
Rule 1.5(a) factors in evaluating a contingent fee in a case involving the death of
a minor). But see Haley v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 273 P.3d 855, 860 (Nev. 2012)
(discussing special factors for evaluating the reasonableness of a lawyer’s contin-
gent fee in connection with the settlement of a minor’s claim). While a court must
mind its special responsibility to protect a minor’s or other incompetent person’s
interests, it should still evaluate a contingent fee agreement between the lawyer
and the minor’s or incompetent person’s guardian or next friend against the 
Model Rule 1.5(a) factors. Wright, 337 S.W.3d at 185. As in other cases, no single
factor necessarily warrants special emphasis over the others. Id. at 186. Depend-
ing on the facts, a court may determine that some factors do or don’t apply, or
should be weighted differently. Id.
98. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
41 F.3d 1032, 1047 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that a lawyer could not ethically con-
tract with a client for a 75 percent contingent fee); In re Martin, 67 A.3d 1032,
1042 (D.C. 2013) (“The combination of [the lawyer’s] contingency fee and the 
hourly fees gave [the lawyer] well over a 50% interest in the outcome of the . . . lit-
igation in violation of Rule 1.5(a).”); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Korotki,
569 A.2d 1224, 1233 (Md. 1990) (“Without passing upon whether there can ever
be circumstances justifying a contingent fee in excess of fifty percent, it is gener-
ally a violation of the rule for the attorney’s stake in the result to exceed the 
client’s stake.”).
99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 35 cmt. c (AM.
LAW INST. 2000).
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will attest, defendants “often vigorously defend and even win
cases where liability seems certain,” and “a previously
undiscovered fact or an unexpected change in the law can
suddenly transform a case that seemed a sure winner at the
outset of the representation into a certain loser.”100 Beyond
that, in a case where liability is certain there still may be a
range of possible recoveries, with the ultimate recovery
dependent upon the lawyer’s performance, such that the 
client benefits from a contingent fee agreement that ties the
lawyer’s compensation to the amount of the recovery.101 
Finally, even where liability appears certain, any judgment
may be hard to collect, and the client may prefer not to pay
the lawyer (or may be unable to do so) until money is
banked.102 It is therefore the general rule that a contingent
fee is not unreasonable merely because a defendant’s liability
seems clear when the fee agreement is made.103 Or, stated
positively, a contingent fee may be reasonable where the
defendant’s liability appears to be clear at the outset of the
representation. But regardless of how you couch the general
rule, the lawyer must explain the liability picture to the
client at the inception of the representation so that the client
can determine whether to agree to a contingent fee.104 
Notwithstanding the general rule, a court may
determine that a contingent fee is unreasonable where “there
is no risk of total non-recovery.”105 This is a case- and fact-
100. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-389, at 7
(1994) (footnote omitted).
101. Id. at 7–8.
102. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 21, § 1.5–3(f), at 205.
103. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-389, at
8 (1994) (concluding “that as a general proposition contingent fees are appropri-
ate and ethical in situations where liability is certain and some recovery is
likely”).
104. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“A
lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”).
105. See, e.g., In re Newman, 958 N.E.2d 792, 797 (Ind. 2011) (declining to hold
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specific inquiry.106 The most common scenario supporting
such a determination is one where the lawyer charges a
contingent fee for “recovering” easily ascertainable and
collectible assets, benefits, or funds the client is clearly
entitled to receive.107 That was the situation in Committee on
Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar v. Tatterson.108 
In Tatterson, Nellie Herbert was the beneficiary under
her son David’s group life insurance policy with Equitable.109 
She hired lawyer David Tatterson to assist her in collecting
“that a contingent fee agreement is per se unethical whenever there is no risk of
total non-recovery,” but concluding that the contingent fee in this case was un-
reasonable because “there was virtually no possibility that [the client] would re-
ceive nothing”).
106. See, e.g., In re Sulzer Hip Prosthesis & Knee Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 290
F. Supp. 2d 840, 853–56 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (concluding that it was unethical for
lawyers to enter into contingent fee agreements with plaintiff class members af-
ter the parties had announced an outline of a settlement agreement); Maynard
Steel Casting Co. v. Sheedy, 2008 WI App 27, ¶ 25, 307 Wis. 2d 653, 746 N.W.2d
816 (entering into a contingent fee agreement after a class action settled; the 
client submitted a proof of claim at the same time it executed the contingent fee 
agreement).
107. See, e.g., In re Gerard, 548 N.E.2d 1051, 1056–57 (Ill. 1989) (charging an
unreasonable contingent fee for identifying and registering certificates of deposit
that were safe in bank accounts under the client’s name); Wash. Mut. Bank, FA
v. Swierk, 2015 IL App (1st) 140639-U, ¶ 19 (finding a contingent fee for the re-
covery of a foreclosure sale surplus unreasonable where the matter was “open
and shut” and the client was undoubtedly entitled to the surplus); Att’y Grievance
Comm’n of Md. v. Kemp, 496 A.2d 672, 678 (Md. 1985) (concluding that “because 
there was no dispute as to payment under [the medical payments provision of an
auto insurance policy] and because the insurer made payment upon receipt of the 
completed benefit form and medical report, the fee charged by [the lawyers] was
clearly excessive”); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Adusei, 991 N.E.2d 1142, 1145 (Ohio
2013) (collecting life insurance proceeds); White v. McBride, 937 S.W.2d 796,
800–01 (Tenn. 1996) (involving probate litigation where the client’s interest in
the estate’s assets was beyond dispute); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 35 illus. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (using as an illustration
of an unreasonable one-third contingent fee a client’s request for assistance col-
lecting life insurance benefits in a case in which there is no reasonable ground to 
dispute that the benefits are due, the insurer does not contest the claim, and the
insurer pays the claim without dispute when the lawyer presents it).
108. 352 S.E.2d 107 (W. Va. 1986).
109. Id. at 109.
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2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 937
the $61,000 in benefits she was due as a result of David’s
suicide.110 In fact, all she needed to do to obtain the benefits
was to accurately complete several forms and send them to
her son’s former employer, Armco, so that it could submit a
claim to Equitable.111 Tatterson assisted her in this process
by obtaining some of the necessary forms, partially
completing one of them, notarizing her signature on another,
and communicating with Armco’s personnel office about the 
claim.112 He charged Ms. Hebert a contingent fee of 33
percent for “recovering” the life insurance proceeds.113 
The West Virginia Supreme Court harshly criticized
Tatterson for his attempts to “justify the contingent fee 
where there was no contingency.”114 It was clear “that there
never was any legitimate doubt about the receipt of the life
insurance proceeds.”115 The court concluded that Tatterson
had charged a clearly excessive fee, and after reviewing his
disciplinary history, disbarred him.116 
Finally, there is a recurring debate over when the 
reasonableness of a contingent fee should be evaluated.
Should the reasonableness of a fee be evaluated only at the 
time the parties agreed to it, or might a contingent fee that
is reasonable at the start of a matter become unreasonable 
through subsequent events? In other words, is it ever
appropriate to evaluate the reasonableness of a contingent
fee retrospectively? The clear majority rule holds that
contingent fee agreements that are reasonable when made 
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 109–10.
113. Id. at 110, 112.
114. Id. at 112.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 113–16.
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may be rendered unreasonable by subsequent events, thus
making hindsight evaluation of those fees perfectly
appropriate.117 In State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v.
Flaniken,118 however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected
the Oklahoma Bar Association’s (OBA) hindsight analysis in
a case in which the lawyer was charged with violating Rule
1.5(a) after entering into a contingent fee agreement that
was unquestionably lawful at the outset of the 
representation.
In Flaniken, the OBA alleged that lawyer Robert
Flaniken violated Rule 1.5(a) by charging an unreasonable
contingent fee in connection with probate litigation in which
he represented Peggy Hepler.119 Flaniken first offered to
represent Hepler on an hourly basis, plus a retainer.120 
Hepler rejected that proposal, but agreed to a contingent
117. See, e.g., Berra v. Springer & Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d 567, 572–73 (Colo.
App. 2010) (concluding that in evaluating the reasonableness of a fee, the trial
court correctly considered events that occurred after the parties entered into their
contingent fee agreement); Wash. Mut. Bank, FA v. Swierk, 2015 IL App (1st)
140639-U, ¶ 15 (explaining that while contingent fee agreements may be valid
when formed, courts must evaluate them for reasonableness later); In re Powell,
953 N.E.2d 1060, 1063–64 (Ind. 2011) (observing that “[e]ven if a fee agreement
is reasonable under the circumstances at the time entered into, subsequent de-
velopments may render collection of the fee unreasonable,” and employing retro-
spective analysis); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Pennington, 733 A.2d 1029,
1036 (Md. 1999) (explaining that because fee agreements that are reasonable
when made may turn out to be unreasonable in light of changed facts and cir-
cumstances, the “reasonableness of a contingent fee agreement, or one with con-
tingent features, must be revisited after the fee is quantified or quantifiable and
tested by the factors enumerated in Rule 1.5(a)”); Rubin v. Murray, 943 N.E.2d
949, 958–59 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (“Because contingency fees are negotiated at
a time of significant uncertainty, and with the possibility that the client lacks
true bargaining power, contingent fee agreements may be reviewed for reasona-
bleness once the attorney’s services are completed and the outcome known.”); In
re Lawrence, 23 N.E.3d 965, 978 (N.Y. 2014) (stating that in some cases, fee 
agreements “that are not unconscionable at inception may become unconsciona-
ble in hindsight.”).
118. 2004 OK 6, 85 P.3d 824 (Okla. 2004).
119. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 4, 8, 85 P.3d at 825.
120. Id. at ¶ 3, 85 P.3d at 825.
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fee.121 The OBA acknowledged that Flaniken’s contingent fee
agreement with Hepler was reasonable at the outset of the 
representation, but that it became unreasonable “upon
reflection.”122 According to the OBA, “a fee should also be
judged in hindsight as to whether it is reasonable in
accordance with the eight factors listed in Rule 1.5(a).”123 The
OBA argued that the fee agreement became unreasonable 
when the will contest that was expected to dominate the
probate case never materialized.124 
The Flaniken court observed at the outset that it was not
deciding a fee dispute and announced that it was offering no
opinion on how a trial court should resolve one; this was a
disciplinary case that required the OBA to establish the
charges against Flaniken by clear and convincing
evidence.125 After lamenting a lack of helpful Oklahoma
precedent,126 the court rather quickly concluded that the
OBA had failed to prove that Flaniken charged an
unreasonable fee in violation of Rule 1.5(a).127 There was no
evidence of impropriety in the formation of the contingent fee 
agreement.128 Rather, Hepler simply developed buyer’s
remorse after the anticipated will contest did not occur and
the probate case proceeded expeditiously.129 But most
importantly for our purposes, the court “reject[ed] the 
proposed ‘hindsight’ test of the [OBA] where a lawyer has
121. Id.
122. Id. at 826.
123. Id. at ¶ 8, 85 P.3d at 826 (footnote omitted).
124. Id.
125. Id. at ¶ 9, 85 P.3d at 827.
126. Id. at ¶ 11, 85 P.3d at 827 (discussing State ex rel. Burk v. City of Okla.
City, 598 P.2d 659 (Okla. 1979), and Oliver’s Sports Ctr., Inc. v. Nat’l Std. Ins.
Co., 615 P.2d 291 (Okla. 1980), and characterizing these cases as not particularly
helpful).
127. Id. at ¶ 12, 85 P.3d at 827.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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lawfully contracted for a percentage of the client’s
recovery.”130 
It is easy to see from its opinion how the Oklahoma
Supreme Court could find that Flaniken did not violate Rule
1.5(a). The court’s decision in his favor seems correct.
However, the Flaniken court’s blanket rejection of
retrospective analysis of the reasonableness of a fee under
Rule 1.5(a) makes no sense. Although it is true that courts
should be reluctant to disturb contingent fee arrangements
that were validly entered into,131 and they should generally
enforce contingent fee agreements as written,132 there is
more to the reasonableness analysis.
First, because Model Rule 1.5(a) provides that a lawyer
may not “collect” an unreasonable fee, retrospective analysis
of a lawyer’s fee agreement is appropriate on that ground.133 
Second, some of the Rule 1.5(a) factors have to be analyzed
in light of events that occur after a fee agreement is
executed.134 The “time and labor required,”135 “the results
obtained,”136 and the “experience, reputation, and ability of
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services”137 all require
retrospective analysis. To pick the most obvious of these, a
court clearly cannot weigh the results obtained in a case 
before, well, there are results. Third, but consistent with the 
second point, if a court considers the amount of a contingent
130. Id.
131. In re Lawrence, 23 N.E.3d 965, 978 (N.Y. 2014) (quoting Lawrence v.
Graubard Miller, 901 N.E.2d 1268, 1272 n.4 (N.Y. 2008)).
132. Rangel v. Save Mart, Inc., 2006-NMCA-120, ¶ 30, 140 N.M. 395, 142 P.3d
983 (quoting Lozano v. GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 1996-NMCA-074, ¶ 27, 122 N.M. 103, 
920 P.2d 1057).
133. In re Doyle, 581 N.E.2d 669, 674 (Ill. 1991).
134. Berra v. Springer & Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d 567, 572 (Colo. App. 2010).
135. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
136. Id. r. 1.5(a)(4).
137. Id. r. 1.5(a)(7).
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fee in its evaluation of reasonableness,138 retrospective
analysis is mandatory because “the dollar amount yielded by
contingent fee formula cannot be determined until after the 
fact, when the contingency has been satisfied.”139 In
summary, by its very terms, Model Rule 1.5(a) contemplates
courts’ hindsight analysis of contingent fees.
C. Changing Fee Agreements: Moving to or from a 
Contingent Fee 
Although many contingent fee controversies focus on the 
reasonableness of a fee either when it was originally agreed
or in light of subsequent developments, difficulties also arise 
where a lawyer attempts to change a fee agreement during
the representation. Assume, for example, that a lawyer
represents a plaintiff in major commercial litigation on an
hourly basis. The client asks the lawyer to restructure their
fee agreement to lessen the financial burden imposed by the 
lawyer’s monthly invoices. The lawyer proposes a hybrid fee 
agreement that provides for a monthly flat fee plus a forty
percent contingent fee to be paid out of any settlement or
judgment. The client agrees, but when the case settles five 
months later, the client refuses to pay the contingent fee on
the basis that it is unconscionable. What then?
Alternatively, consider a case in which a lawyer agrees
to represent a client for a contingent fee of one-third of any
recovery by way of settlement or judgment. When it appears
that the case will be difficult to win, or that the best result
for the client will be injunctive or other non-monetary relief,
the lawyer insists that the client pay her by the hour rather
than on contingency. Must the client agree or risk the 
lawyer’s withdrawal from the representation?
Model Rule 1.5(b) governs lawyers’ communications with
138. See id. r. 1.5(a)(4) (identifying “the amount involved and the results ob-
tained” as factors).
139. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 74, § 9.08, at 9–36.
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clients concerning the basis or rate of the fees for which the
client will be responsible.140 It provides:
The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and
expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be
communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within
a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except
when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the 
same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or
expenses shall also be communicated to the client.141 
Model Rule 1.5(b) is intended to ensure that the client is
fully informed as to the terms of the lawyer’s engagement
and the client’s financial responsibility.142 A lawyer may
violate Rule 1.5(b) by failing to communicate with a client
about the basis or rate of fees even if the fees are
reasonable,143 although the chances of discipline in such a
case are probably remote.144 
Under Model Rule 1.5(b), a lawyer may change the basis
or rate of the fee as long as she communicates the change to 
the client within a reasonable time.145 Simply reflecting a
change in invoices sent to a client is insufficient.146 Although
the language of the rule suggests that a lawyer may change 
a fee agreement unilaterally, that is not the case; the client,
140. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
141. Id.
142. DeGraaff v. Fusco, 660 A.2d 9, 11–12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
143. See, e.g., In re Lauter, 933 N.E.2d 1258, 1261–62 (Ind. 2010) (discussing
lawyer’s failure to communicate an additional retainer, and finding a Rule 1.5(b)
violation even though there was no allegation that the fee was unreasonable).
144. See, e.g., In re Dalton, 2009-1288, p. 7 (La. 10/02/09); 18 So. 3d 743, 747
(reasoning that while the lawyer’s change to his fee agreement contradicted a
“strict reading” of Rule 1.5(b), discipline was inappropriate because the change
reduced the client’s fee).
145. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
146. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Nelissen, 871 N.W.2d 694, 699
(Iowa 2015); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Culver, 849 A.2d 423, 445 (Md.
2004); Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility v. Asay, 2016 WY 47, ¶¶ 2–3, 374 P.3d 295,
297, 305 (Wyo. 2016).
       
 
       
       
     
       
  
     
       
         
     
       
         
         
       
          
 
               
         
            
                
            
              
             
              
            
           
         
          
       
           
              
            
              
              
       
              
                
             
               
           
              
               
                
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 943
naturally, must agree to the change.147 If the client does not
agree, she will presumably either negotiate a different fee
with the lawyer or terminate the lawyer’s representation.148 
A modified fee agreement must still satisfy the Rule 1.5(a)
reasonableness requirement.149 
With respect to changes in fee agreements mid-
representation, however, courts’ analysis seldom ends with
Rule 1.5. Most courts called upon to consider the propriety of
midstream changes to lawyers’ fee agreements also examine
ethics rules governing lawyers’ business transactions with
clients.150 This is true even though a lawyer’s entry into a
contingent fee agreement with a client at the outset of a
representation is not considered to be a business transaction
with a client within the meaning of Model Rule 1.8(a).151 
147. Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Gerace, 72 A.3d 567, 573, 577 (Md.
2013) (quoting the trial judge and later agreeing with his ruling).
148. Where the lawyer represents the client in consecutive matters and
changes the basis or rate of the fee for the second one, the client will presumably
enter into the second representation on the terms offered by the lawyer, negotiate 
different terms, or decline to hire the lawyer the second time. See Weinstein v.
Stuart, No. CV020816030, 2006 WL 3041976, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 12,
2006) (“The [lawyer] sent an authorization to the defendant . . . respecting the
[first] matter stating his hourly rates at $160-185 per hour and another authori-
zation in November 1998 respecting another matter stating his hourly rate at
$185. . . . Since Rule 1.5(b) does not require the client’s consent, [the authoriza-
tions] fairly apprised defendant of [the lawyer’s] hourly rate of $185. Defendant
did not object to that rate at the time.”).
149. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 74, § 9.14, at 9–50.
150. See, e.g., In re Corcella, 994 N.E.2d 1127, 1128 (Ind. 2013) (discussing
Rule 1.8(a)); Cotton v. Kronenberg, 44 P.3d 878, 884–85 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)
(applying Rule 1.8(a) in a case where the lawyer acquired an interest in the cli-
ent’s real property); see also, e.g., Mayhew v. Benninghoff, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 27, 30
(Ct. App. 1997) (applying California Rule 3-300).
151. See, e.g., Premier Networks, Inc. v. Stadheim & Grear, Ltd., 918 N.E.2d
1117, 1121 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (“There is no allegation . . . that Stadheim ‘entered
into a business transaction’ with Premier. The . . . parties agreed to a contingent
fee arrangement. . . .”); In re Discipline of an Att’y, 884 N.E.2d 450, 458 (Mass.
2008) (explaining that Rule 1.8(a) “is generally concerned with business dealings
between a lawyer and a client, or the lawyer’s acquisition of a ‘pecuniary interest’
adverse to his client, that commence after the legal representation begins . . . the
focus of the rule is not on a fee agreement between a lawyer and client that marks
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Courts’ application of Model Rule 1.8(a) to midstream fee
changes in which a contingent component is added further
seems contrary to a comment to Model Rule 1.8, which
explains that the rule “does not apply to ordinary fee 
arrangements between client[s] and lawyer[s], which are
governed by Rule 1.5,” and limits Model Rule 1.8’s reach to 
cases where “the lawyer accepts an interest in the client’s
business or other nonmonetary property as payment of all or
part of a fee.”152 Although contracts between lawyers and
clients made after an attorney-client relationship is
established raise concerns about the lawyer’s exertion of
undue influence,153 contingent fees are commonplace, and
they are amply regulated under Model Rule 1.5. Any
disclosure or informational requirements that courts might
impose on the lawyer are already covered by Model Rule 
1.4(b).154 Yet courts regularly invoke Rule 1.8(a) in cases
where the parties revise their fee agreement to provide for a
contingent fee.155 
Under Model Rule 1.8(a), a lawyer cannot enter into a
business transaction with a client, or acquire “an ownership,
the creation of their lawyer-client relationship.”); Gillespie v. Hernden, 516
S.W.3d 541, 550 (Tex. App. 2016) (stating that when the clients entered into a
contingent fee agreement with the lawyer, “they contracted with him to provide 
legal services . . . they did not enter into a business transaction with him.”) (cita-
tions omitted); Rafel Law Grp. PLLC v. Defoor, 308 P.3d 767, 773 (Wash. Ct. App.
2013) (“The rule does not apply to transactions entered into prior to the creation
of the attorney-client relationship or those agreed upon during the relationship’s
formation.”) (footnote omitted).
152. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
153. McNamara v. O’Donnell Haddad LLC, 2016 IL App (2d) 150519-U, ¶ 24;
No. 2-15-0519, 2016 WL 769754, at *7 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 26, 2016); In re Law-
rence, 23 N.E.3d 965, 976 (N.Y. 2014); N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 910, at 4
(2012).
154. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (imposing
an explanatory requirement on lawyers).
155. See, e.g., In re Corcella, 994 N.E.2d at 1128 (violating Rule 1.8(a) in chang-
ing from an hourly fee to a contingent fee); In re Hefron, 771 N.E.2d 1157, 1162
(Ind. 2002) (violating Rule 1.8(a) by unfairly switching from an hourly fee to a
contingent fee).
       
 
       
   
         
          
          
   
            
        
      
          
          
         
   
       
        
         
         
          
      
        
      
       
     
        
        
      
        
        
        
 
 
           
     
     
     
   
   
   
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 945
possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest” adverse to
a client, unless:
(1) the transaction and the terms on which the lawyer acquires the
interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed
and transmitted in writing in a manner that can reasonably be 
understood by the client;
(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and
is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent
legal counsel on the transaction; and
(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the 
client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer’s role
in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the 
client in the transaction.156 
In re Hefron157 is an illustrative Rule 1.8(a) case,
although littered with incidents of blatant misconduct by the 
lawyer. In In re Hefron, lawyer William Hefron agreed to 
represent a client in an action to recover assets belonging to 
an estate on an hourly basis, but he wanted to change to a
contingent fee when he learned how flush the estate likely
was.158 When the client—who knew nothing of the estate’s
value—balked at the proposed change, Hefron threatened to 
withdraw.159 He told the client that a contingent fee was
crucial because he expected prolonged and difficult
litigation.160 In fact, opposing counsel had promised to
deliver an accounting of the estate’s assets and volunteered
to transfer the assets to the client.161 After deliberating for
weeks, the client agreed to pay Hefron a contingent fee of
twenty-one percent of all assets recovered in the litigation,
plus four percent for administering the estate as personal
representative.162 
156. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
157. 771 N.E.2d at 1162–63.
158. Id. at 1159–60.
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Afterwards, without telling the client, and without
informing the probate court that he was about to receive the
accounting, Hefron obtained judicial approval of his
contingent fee.163 Hard on the heels of that maneuver, he
obtained the estate’s assets, delivered them to the client, and
returned to the probate court to obtain approval of the
payment of his fee—again without telling the client about
any of this.164 
The client ultimately fired Hefron and the probate court
substantially reduced his fee.165 In a subsequent disciplinary
action, the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that Hefron
violated Rule 1.8(a) by unfairly renegotiating his fee 
agreement.166 The court determined that his “motivation for
his renegotiation of the fee agreement was his own pecuniary
gain . . . . [He] insisted on an hourly rate when recovery was
not assured but coerced his client into acquiescing in a
contingency fee agreement once the likelihood of a
substantial recovery arose.”167 The contingent fee agreement
and the circumstances in which it was negotiated were 
unfair to the client.168 Even if the fee agreement’s terms had
been fair, Hefron never gave the client a reasonable 
opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel
concerning the transaction as Rule 1.8(a) requires.169 In the
end, the court suspended Hefron from practice for six
months.170 
In re Lawrence171 stands in sharp contrast to In re
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1160–61.
165. Id. at 1161.
166. Id. at 1162.




171. 23 N.E.3d 965 (N.Y. 2014).
       
 
         
       
        
       
      
        
        
     
         
         
      
      
      
        
       
       
     
       
         
      
        
       
        
      
 
     
   
   
   
   
     
   
   
   
   
     
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 947
Hefron. The In re Lawrence saga began in 1983, when the 
law firm Graubard Miller (Graubard) began representing
Alice Lawrence in litigation arising out of the death of her
husband, Sylvan Lawrence, a wealthy real estate
developer.172 Seymour Cohn, who was Mr. Lawrence’s
brother and business partner, was the executor of Mr.
Lawrence’s estate.173 He refused to sell the properties in Mr.
Lawrence’s real estate empire.174 Mrs. Lawrence
consequently sued Cohn in 1983, launching years of bitter
estate litigation.175 As both a client and a litigant, Mrs.
Lawrence was “intelligent, tough and sophisticated in
business matters.”176 She immersed herself in the case and
reviewed everything that Graubard filed.177 “She demanded
to be the ‘senior partner’ in the litigation,” and kept a tight
hand on Graubard’s reins.178 Indeed, she threatened to fire
the firm when she was dissatisfied with its performance and
freely disregarded her lawyers’ advice.179 
By late 2004, Mrs. Lawrence had paid Graubard
approximately $18 million in hourly fees in connection with
the estate litigation.180 The focus of the litigation at that
point was accounting objections based on Cohn’s alleged self-
dealing while serving as executor.181 When, in December
2004, Mrs. Lawrence shockingly lost her largest accounting
objection, she decided to seek a new fee agreement.182 She 










182. Id. at 971.
      
 
          
       
           
           
   
      
        
       
        
      
        
        
        
    
       
       
        
       
         
         
       
      
        
       
       
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
     
   
      
     
948 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
and Daniel Chill, her lead attorney at Graubard, discussed a
possible contingent fee.183 After some back and forth, they
agreed on a contingent fee of forty percent of the net recovery
after a deduction of up to $1.2 million in hourly charges for
calendar year 2005.184 
Graubard sent Mrs. Lawrence a revised retainer 
agreement that included the forty percent contingent fee and
2005 hourly fee deduction.185 She reviewed the document
with her accountant, Jay Wallberg.186 After consulting with
Wallberg, she insisted on adding a paragraph to the 
agreement to clarify that Graubard was to continue billing
hourly for one year only.187 Graubard inserted the paragraph
and sent her the now-final revised retainer agreement, which
she signed in January 2005.188 
The estate litigation unexpectedly settled in May 2005 in
the middle of a hearing on some of the remaining accounting
objections.189 This turn of events closely followed Graubard’s
“‘smoking gun’ discovery” of Cohn’s “egregious self-dealing”
in connection with a transaction known as the Epps claim.190 
As a result, Cohn’s estate (he died in 2003) offered more than
$100 million to settle the case.191 This amount “was about
twice what Graubard estimated the remaining claims to be
worth; essentially, the ‘smoking gun’ revelation was so
damaging that the Cohn estate paid a substantial premium







189. Id. at 972.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 969, 972.
192. Id. at 972.
       
 
     
        
        
       
      
     
    
         
       
      
    
      
      
   
     
      
       
   
      
         
        
         
      
      
       
     
     
 
     
     
   
     
       
              
  
     
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 949
After the settlement was concluded, Mrs. Lawrence 
refused to pay Graubard the forty percent contingent fee due
under the revised retainer agreement, which was around $44
million.193 In the resulting Surrogate’s Court litigation, a
referee determined that the revised retainer agreement “was
not procedurally or substantively unconscionable when
made, but became substantively unconscionable in
hindsight” by virtue of its size, disproportion to the firm’s
efforts, and the firm’s relatively low risk.194 He recommended
that Graubard receive a $15.8 million fee.195 
The Surrogate’s Court affirmed the referee’s fee 
recommendation, but an appellate court reversed, finding
the revised retainer agreement both procedurally and
substantively unconscionable.196 The appellate court
reasoned that the agreement was procedurally
unconscionable because Graubard had not shown that Mrs.
Lawrence fully grasped its terms.197 With respect to
substantive unconscionability, the appellate court observed
that because Graubard had privately calculated Mrs.
Lawrence’s claims to be worth around $47 million, it was
unlikely that the firm had materially risked a substantial
loss of fees from the switch to a contingent fee.198 The
appellate court also considered the contingent fee to be
excessive in comparison to the time the firm spent on the
litigation after the revised retainer agreement took effect.199 
The appellate court remanded the case to the Surrogate’s
Court to determine the fees due the firm under the original
193. Id. at 973.
194. Id. at 974.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 974–75.
197. Id. at 975 (citation omitted).
198. Id. at 975–76 (quoting In re Lawrence, 965 N.Y.S.2d 495, 497–98 (App.
Div. 2013), rev’d, 23 N.E.3d 965 (N.Y. 2014)).
199. Id. at 976.
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hourly fee agreement, plus prejudgment interest from the
date the agreement was changed.200 
Graubard appealed to the New York Court of Appeals,
which is New York’s highest court. The In re Lawrence court
reversed the lower appellate court.201 
The In re Lawrence court began its analysis by
recounting that courts subject fee agreements between
lawyers and clients to particular scrutiny.202 The lawyer
bears the burden of showing that the agreement is fair and
reasonable, and that the client fully understands it.203 A fee
agreement revised after the lawyer has begun work is
studied even more rigorously, because the parties have
established a confidential relationship and the lawyer’s
ability to exploit the client is enhanced.204 
Here, the parties agreed that a forty percent contingent
fee was not “automatically unconscionable.”205 Rather, Mrs.
Lawrence’s estate (she died before the appeal was heard)
argued that the revised retainer agreement was void for two 
reasons: (1) it was procedurally unconscionable because Mrs.
Lawrence “did not fully know and understand its nature;”
and (2) it was substantively unconscionable because the law
firm took no risk in entering into it, and in retrospect, the
$44 million contingent fee was “disproportionately excessive”
given the effort Graubard devoted to the litigation.206 
Determining whether the revised retainer agreement
was procedurally unconscionable required the In re




203. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 499 N.E.2d 864, 866 (N.Y.
1986)).
204. Id. (citing In re Howell, 109 N.E. 572 (N.Y. 1915)).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 969, 976.
       
 
       
        
    
         
      
        
             
         
          
          
        
       
 
             
           
         
          
           
        
   
       
       
        
     
     
          
        
        
        
      
   
      
 
     
     
   
     
   
   
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 951
agreement.207 The “most important factor” in this analysis
was whether Mrs. Lawrence “was fully informed upon
entering the agreement.”208 Clearly, she was:
The . . . evidence demonstrated that [Mrs.] Lawrence fully
understood the revised retainer agreement, which she herself
sought. [She] was abreast of the status of the litigation
because . . . she was involved in every detail of the case. She also 
sent the proposed agreement to Wallberg, her trusted accountant,
who reviewed it, explained it to [her], and even proposed that
Graubard clarify the duration of the hourly charges capped at $1.2
million. Graubard made the changes [she] requested, and she 
signed the agreement four days after she received the revised
version.
Contrary to the . . . estate’s assertions, the . . . calculations
required to understand the 40% contingency fee are not so difficult
for a layperson to comprehend, let alone a sophisticated
businesswoman. Any doubt about Lawrence’s understanding . . . of
the proposed fee was dispelled by Wallberg, . . . who testified that
he explained to [Mrs.] Lawrence exactly what the 40% contingency
fee required of her.209 
As for any allegation that Graubard concealed the 
settlement or judgment value of the estate litigation and
thus the possible contingent fee, it was apparent that when
Mrs. Lawrence executed the revised fee agreement, neither
she nor Graubard anticipated the eventual settlement.210 
They did not then know about the “smoking gun” in the form
of the Epps claim that would seismically alter the estate
litigation.211 In short, Graubard never withheld from Mrs.
Lawrence the possibility of a $100 million recovery, as was
actually achieved after the Epps claim erupted.212 
With respect to the alleged substantive 
unconscionability of the contingent fee, the court recognized
207. Id. at 976–77.
208. Id. at 977.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 978.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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that legal fees that are reasonable at the outset of a
representation may become unconscionable in retrospect if
they are grossly disproportionate to the value of the services
rendered.213 What this really means, though, “is that ‘the
amount of the fee, standing alone and unexplained, may be
sufficient to show that an unfair advantage was taken of the 
client or, in other words, that a legal fraud was perpetrated
upon him.’”214 Absent incompetence on the client’s part, or
deception or overreaching by the lawyer, a contingent fee
agreement that is valid at inception should be enforced
according to its terms.215 
Here, Graubard undertook significant risk in entering into a
contingency fee arrangement. . . . The risk to an attorney in any
retainer agreement is that the client may terminate it at any time,
“leaving the lawyer . . . only the right to recover on quantum
meruit”. . . . This danger is amplified in the context of a client who 
frequently fires professionals (including attorneys), as [Mrs.]
Lawrence had done in the past and threatened to do once again.
Beyond the . . . risk that Lawrence would lose interest in the 
case or fire Graubard, the law firm faced the prospect that
this . . . litigation would drag on for . . . years . . . with the non-
hourly fee as its only compensation for many hours of work. In just
the five months after entering into the contingency fee 
arrangement, Graubard lawyers spent nearly 4,000 hours
preparing for the [hearing] in May 2005, the first of the many trials
that were envisaged before the case so unexpectedly settled. In sum,
Graubard ran the risk that its fees would not cover costs over a
period of years, and that Lawrence would fire them or . . . drop the
claims. Especially given a client who frequently . . . ignored her
lawyers, the law firm also took the chance that Lawrence would
reject a settlement . . . that she was advised to accept, or . . . accept
an offer that Graubard deemed to be unwise.
[W]e also must consider the proportionality of the value of
Graubard’s services to the fee it now seeks. . . . [T]he value of
Graubard’s services should not be measured merely by the time it
devoted to prosecuting the claims. . . . Rather, the value of
213. Id. (quoting King v. Fox, 851 N.E.2d 1184, 1191 (N.Y. 2006)).
214. Id. (quoting Gair v. Peck, 160 N.E.2d 43, 48 (N.Y. 1959)).
215. Id. (citing In re Lawrence, 901 N.E.2d 1268, 1272 n.4 (N.Y. 2008)).
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Graubard’s services (for the purpose of hindsight analysis) should
be the $111 million recovery it obtained for [Mrs.] Lawrence.216 
The court appreciated Graubard’s view that
retrospective analysis of contingent fee agreements that
were equitable when made is a perilous exercise, especially
where alleged unconscionability rests solely on the
perception that the fee is too high.217 After all, the nature of 
a contingent fee is such that a lawyer, through skill, luck, or
both, may quickly achieve a superior result; conversely, she 
may labor for years for little or no reward.218 And, again, Mrs.
Lawrence “was no naif.”219 The court consequently saw fit to
honor the clear terms of the revised retainer agreement.220 
After considering some additional arguments by the
Lawrence estate, the court remanded the case to the 
Surrogate’s Court to enter a decree consistent with the 
opinion.221 The Graubard firm thus won a substantial
victory.
In conclusion, lawyers and clients are generally
permitted to modify contingent fee agreements.222 A lawyer
must proceed cautiously, however, when considering
changes to a fee agreement once a representation is under
way. A lawyer must communicate any proposed fee change 
216. Id. at 978–79 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
217. Id. at 979 (citing In re Smart World Tech., LLC, 552 F.3d 228, 235 (2d Cir.
2009)).
218. Id. (recognizing that most cases fall somewhere along a continuum be-
tween these two extremes).
219. Id.
220. Id. (citing Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 538 Madison Realty Co., 807 N.E.2d 876,
879 (N.Y. 2004)).
221. Id. at 982.
222. See Neb. Ethics Advisory Op. for Lawyers 10-01, 2010 WL 11064775, at
*5 (Neb. Judicial Ethics Comm. 2010) (“[T]he Nebraska lawyer and his client ap-
pear to have negotiated the original contingent fee agreement and the modified
contingent fee agreement by mutual consent and at arms length. The parties
were free to negotiate these terms and the modifications of these terms as they
wished.”).
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to the client clearly and in writing;223 advise the client of the
wisdom of consulting independent counsel concerning the 
proposed change;224 and give the client reasonable time to
seek separate counsel,225 although the requirement that the
client be directed to independent counsel should not attach
where the client is an organization with an in-house law
department. The lawyer also needs to obtain the client’s
written consent to the fee change.226 
Lawyers cannot attempt to modify fee agreements after
the events or results they believe entitle them to different
compensation.227 Certainly, lawyers should never modify fee
agreements in circumstances that allow clients to argue that
they agreed to changes under duress. For example, a lawyer
should not threaten to withdraw from litigation on the eve of
trial unless the client agrees to change their fee 
agreement.228 
Of course, there are also contract law concerns when
changing a fee agreement. To be enforceable, the new fee
agreement must be supported by adequate consideration.229 
223. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017); id. r.
1.8(a)(1).
224. Id. r. 1.8(a)(2).
225. Id.
226. Id. r. 1.8(a)(3).
227. See, e.g., In re Thayer, 745 N.E.2d 207, 211–12 (Ind. 2001) (finding that
the lawyer violated Rules 1.5(a) and 1.8(a) by increasing the percentage of his
contingent fee after receiving a settlement offer that the client instructed him to
accept).
228. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-458, at
2 (2011) (stating that a lawyer generally may not “threaten to withdraw if the 
client does not agree to increase the fee.”); see, e.g., McConwell v. FMG of Kan.
City, Inc., 861 P.2d 830, 842–43 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing a lawyer’s
threatened withdrawal on the eve of trial in connection with successful malprac-
tice allegations).
229. See, e.g., Lugassy v. Indep. Fire Ins. Co., 636 So. 2d 1332, 1335 (Fla. 1994)
(finding that there was adequate consideration for changing the parties’ fee 
agreement to allow the lawyer to receive a statutory fee award rather than the 
original contingent fee); Rowe v. Law Offices of Ben C. Brodhead, P.C., 735 S.E.2d
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Additionally, the consideration supporting the new fee 
agreement must be “‘new and distinct’ from the consideration
offered in connection with the original contract.”230 
D. The Writing Requirement 
Finally, Model Rule 1.5(c) requires that contingent fee 
agreements be in writing, be signed by the client, and include 
specified information:
A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client
and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined,
including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the
lawyer in the event of settlement, trial, or appeal; litigation and
other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such
expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is 
calculated. The agreement must clearly notify the client of any
expenses for which the client will be liable whether or not the client
is the prevailing party.231 
The rule is intended to establish the parties’ obligations
at the start of the representation to avoid later confusion or
disagreement about the fee that is due.232 A lawyer must put
a contingent fee agreement in writing even if she regularly
represents the client on other matters.233 
If a contingent fee agreement is not in writing as Rule 
39, 43–44 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that the lawyer furnished adequate con-
sideration for the modification of the fee agreement).
230. Barrett-O’Neill v. LALO, L.L.C., 171 F. Supp. 3d 725, 739 (S.D. Ohio 2016)
(quoting Thurston v. Ludwig, 6 Ohio St. 1, 6 (1856)); see also Chesapeake Appa-
lachia, L.L.C. v. Hickman, 781 S.E.2d 198, 216 (W. Va. 2015) (“Consideration is
an essential element of a valid contract, and it is axiomatic that past considera-
tion already given for a previous agreement cannot constitute valid consideration
for a new agreement.”); Lugassy, 636 So. 2d at 1335 (stating that “general rules
of contract law allow parties to alter the terms of a retainer agreement as long as
new consideration is given”).
231. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(c) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2017).
232. In re Fink, 22 A.3d 461, 468 (Vt. 2011).
233. Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Dixon, 772 A.2d 160, 164 (Conn. App. Ct.
2001).
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1.5(c) requires, courts often hold that it is unenforceable.234 
On the right facts, however, a court may enforce an oral
contingent fee agreement, as the Arkansas Supreme Court
did in Hotel Associates, Inc. v. Rieves, Rubens & Mayton.235 
In that case, Buddy House hired Kent Rubens of the law
firm of Rieves, Rubens & Mayton (RRM) to sue Holiday Inn
Franchising, Inc., on behalf of his company, Hotel
Associates.236 Rubens had represented House for years and
they were close.237 As was their habit, they had no written
fee agreement.238 It was undisputed, however, that Hotel
Associates agreed to pay Rubens a contingent fee equal to
one-third of any recovery.239 Rubens asked a lawyer from
outside RRM, Timothy Dudley, to assist him in the matter.240 
Rubens and Dudley agreed to split the one-third contingent
fee if the litigation succeeded.241 
Rubens died after filing the lawsuit, but Dudley
continued to represent Hotel Associates in the Holiday Inn
litigation.242 RRM dissolved in the meantime.243 Dudley tried
the case and won an eight-figure verdict.244 Hotel Associates
agreed to pay his one-sixth contingent fee, but refused to pay
234. See, e.g., Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis, 668 So. 2d 180, 185–86 (Fla. 1995);
Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Womack, 269 S.W.3d 409, 413 (Ky. 2008); Starkey, Kelly, Blaney
& White v. Estate of Nicolaysen, 796 A.2d 238, 242 (N.J. 2002) (concluding that
the lawyer’s failure to reduce a contingent fee to writing for 33 months also vio-
lated Rule 1.5(b)).
235. 435 S.W.3d 488 (Ark. 2014).







243. Id. at 491.
244. Id.
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the fee owed to RRM.245 In the resulting litigation, Hotel
Associates contended that RRM could not recover its claimed
fee on a breach of contract theory because an oral contingent
fee contract was unenforceable as against public policy as
expressed in Rule 1.5(c).246 RRM responded that Hotel
Associates’ position contradicted the principle that a
violation of an ethics rule will not support a civil cause of
action, and that the oral fee agreement should be enforced
based on the facts.247 The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed
with RRM.248 
While noting the Rule 1.5(c) requirement that contingent
fee agreements be in writing, the Hotel Associates court
declined “to draw a bright-line rule” because in this case the 
circumstances “compel[led] the enforcement of the
agreement.”249 Indeed, the existence and the terms of the
agreement were undisputed, and Hotel Associates did not
contest the reasonableness of the agreed fee.250 Critically,
Rubens and House had a long personal and professional
relationship.251 Because of this relationship of mutual trust
and confidence, they did not put their agreements in
writing.252 On “these unique facts,” the oral contingent fee
agreement was enforceable according to its terms.253 
Hotel Associates is an unusual case, but other courts
have held that oral contingent fee agreements are
enforceable despite violating Rule 1.5(c).254 Furthermore, a
245. Id.
246. Id. at 492.
247. Id.






254. See, e.g., Parke v. Glover, Civ. A. No. 11-00639-KD-M, 2013 U.S. Dist.
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lawyer’s or law firm’s right to compensation for services
rendered in a case in which the contingent fee agreement
violates Rule 1.5(c) is well established. Even courts holding
that oral contingent fee agreements are unenforceable 
generally permit the lawyers to recover the value of their
services in quantum meruit.255 Similarly, a lawyer is
generally entitled to recovery in quantum meruit where a
contingent fee agreement is deficient in other respects, such
as failing to specify how litigation expenses will be 
deducted.256 
For that matter, the Hotel Associates holding makes
perfect sense if you recall that Model Rule 1.5(c) is intended
to establish the parties’ respective obligations at the start of
the representation to avoid later confusion or disagreement
over the fee that is due.257 The holding also is understandable
if you think of the Rule 1.5(c) writing requirements as being
intended to ensure the client’s informed consent to the basis
and amount of the fee rather than guiding the mechanical
preparation of contingent fee agreements. Either way,
because it was clear to the court that House understood the
LEXIS 15168, at *8–9 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 5, 2013) (interpreting Alabama law); Cozen
O’Connor, PC v. Norman, No. 3:08cv1773 (MRK), 2011 WL 219666, at *5 (D.
Conn. Jan. 21, 2011) (concluding that oral contingent fee agreements are enforce-
able under Delaware and Pennsylvania law, and are enforceable under Connect-
icut law unless they relate to a personal injury, wrongful death, or property dam-
age case).
255. See, e.g., United States v. 36.06 Acres of Land, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274– 
76 (D.N.M. 1999) (predicting New Mexico law); Mullens v. Hansel-Henderson, 65
P.3d 992, 995 (Colo. 2002) (discussing a Colorado court rule); Chandris, S.A. v.
Yanakakis, 668 So. 2d 180, 186 n.4 (Fla. 1995); Major v. OEC-Diasonics, Inc., 743
N.E.2d 276, 281–82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Womack, 269 S.W.3d
409, 413 (Ky. 2008); Kourouvacilis v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 841
N.E.2d 1273, 1275 n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006); Tobin v. Jerry, 243 S.W.3d 437, 441
(Mo. Ct. App. 2007); Starkey, Kelly, Blaney & White v. Est. of Nicolaysen, 796
A.2d 238, 243 (N.J. 2002); Robertson v. Steris Corp., 760 S.E.2d 313, 321 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2014).
256. See, e.g., Partee v. Compton, 653 N.E.2d 454, 456 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (in-
volving a predecessor rule).
257. In re Fink, 22 A.3d 461, 468 (Vt. 2011).
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fee agreement and consented to it, and the fee was
reasonable, it would have been pointless to invalidate the 
agreement for want of paperwork.
II. THE EFFECT OF EARLY SETTLEMENT OFFERS 
As we have seen, contingent fees are regularly tested for
reasonableness. Critics of contingent fees and some courts
are especially concerned about reasonableness in cases
where (a) the defendant settles before suit is filed or early in
the litigation and the plaintiff’s lawyer receives a contingent
fee that seems disproportionate to the time spent on the 
matter; or (b) the plaintiff rejects an early settlement offer
either before or after retaining a lawyer, and the plaintiff’s
lawyer charges a contingent fee based on a subsequent
settlement or judgment that includes the amount of the prior
offer.
A. The Lawyer’s Fee When the Client Settles Early 
A lawyer representing a plaintiff pursuant to a
contingent fee agreement has no obligation to make or solicit
a settlement offer early in a case.258 If a lawyer charging a
contingent fee makes an early settlement offer and the
defendant accepts it, or if the defendant makes an early
settlement offer and the lawyer’s client accepts it, the lawyer
may still collect the full fee for which she contracted.259 Early
settlement of a case does not alone mean that the plaintiff’s
lawyer did not earn her fee. For instance, the lawyer may
have harnessed all of her advocacy skills to negotiate a
reasonable settlement short of filing a lawsuit, the lawyer
may have prepared a compelling demand letter or complaint
that brought the defendant to the settlement table in short
order, or the lawyer’s reputation may be such that the
258. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 21, § 1.5-3(g), at 205.
259. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-389, at 8
(1994).
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defendant believed early settlement to be the prudent
course.260 By way of further example, perhaps the lawyer
doggedly worked up the case before suing and as a result of
her efforts generally or her discovery of a smoking gun, the
defendant became motivated to settle quickly. Although
every case pivots on its unique facts, in these instances it
seems reasonable to presume that the lawyer has earned her
contingent fee even if the anticipated litigation does not
materialize or does not last as long as originally anticipated.
There may, however, be early settlement situations in
which a lawyer should retreat from her contingent fee 
agreement and instead charge for her time spent on the 
matter or accept a flat fee.261 For example, if a lawyer was
reasonably confident that the defendant would make an
acceptable settlement offer as soon as demand was made or
suit was filed and extensive preparation was not required,
the lawyer should perhaps agree to an hourly fee “since, from
the information known to the lawyer, there was little risk of
non-recovery and the lawyer’s efforts would have brought
little value” to the client.262 Alternatively, the lawyer might
reduce her contingent fee percentage and accept a lower fee 
to account for the reduced risk of non-recovery and the
shortened time between the performance of her services and
compensation for them.263 
260. See Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Ashworth, 851 A.2d 527, 534 (Md.
2004) (quoting the trial court in concluding that the lawyer charged a reasonable 
contingent fee in a case that settled without suit being filed).
261. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-389, at
8 (1994) (discussing early settlement offers and observing that there “may none-
theless be special situations in which a contingent fee may not be appropriate”).
262. Id. (footnote omitted).
263. See id. (stating that if a contingent fee is appropriate in connection with
an early settlement, “the fee arrangement should recognize the likelihood of an
early favorable result by providing for a significantly smaller percentage recovery
if the anticipated offer is received and accepted than if the case must go forward
through discovery, trial and appeal”) (footnote omitted).
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B. Claiming a Full Contingent Fee after the Client’s 
Rejection of an Early Settlement Offer 
If a defendant makes an early settlement offer that the 
client rejects but the client ultimately prevails, the question
then becomes whether the lawyer’s contingent fee should be
based on the total amount recovered or on the amount
recovered less the amount of the early settlement offer.
Consider a case in which the defendant offers to settle for
$150,000 before suit is filed. The client rejects the offer. The 
lawyer pursues litigation and the case eventually settles at
mediation for $600,000. Should the lawyer’s one-third
contingent fee be calculated based on the $600,000
settlement, or should the lawyer receive only one-third of
$450,000? In a variation on this example, what if the 
defendant offered the client $150,000 before the client
retained the lawyer, such that the lawyer can claim no credit
for that portion of the settlement? Finally, what if the lawyer
ultimately recovers no more than the amount of the early
settlement offer (in our example $150,000), regardless of
whether that offer was made before or after the client hired
her?
In Formal Opinion 94-389, the ABA’s Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
concluded that a lawyer is entitled to her full contingent fee 
in a case in which the client rejected an early settlement offer
even if the amount of the ultimate recovery does not exceed
the amount of that offer.264 In reaching that conclusion, the
Committee recognized “the substantial time and effort that
is required to take the matter to trial as well as the lawyer’s
assumption of the real risk that the plaintiff[ ] will lose on
the merits or that any judgment at trial may be less than the 
early offer.”265 Although the Committee considered as an
example a case that went to trial, the same reasoning applies
264. Id. at 9.
265. Id.
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where a case settles short of trial but after the lawyer has
conducted extensive discovery, engaged in significant motion
practice, and so on.
As the Committee further explained, limiting a lawyer’s
contingent fee in a case in which the defendant makes an
early settlement offer would require adherence to faulty
reasoning.266 This is because the argument for limiting a
lawyer’s contingent fee in this context seems to assume “that
by making an early [settlement] offer the defendant is
conceding all liability up to that amount, thereby eradicating
the possibility of non-recovery by the plaintiff.”267 But in fact:
[E]arly settlement offers are made for numerous reasons besides a
concession of liability. And as any experienced trial lawyer knows,
once an early settlement offer is rejected, the defendant and its
lawyer will, in most cases, do their best to defend both against the 
fact of liability and the amount of damages owed. There is generally
a real risk to the client and to the lawyer being paid on a contingent
fee basis that such a defense will be successful. It is ethical for the
lawyer to be compensated for both the time she expends to defeat
any such defenses and the risk she assumes that the plaintiff will
not prevail at trial or that a judgment awarded may never be
collected.
The lawyer is also being compensated for the risk she assumes
that the client will fire the lawyer, a right the client might exercise 
at any time. . . . Additionally, the lawyer is being compensated for
the often lengthy delay between the time work is performed and the 
time a fee is received.268 
As a result, it is ethically permissible for a lawyer to 
collect a contingent fee on the total recovery in a case that
includes the amount of an early settlement offer.269 
The ABA’s position in Formal Opinion 94-389 drew
harsh reviews from some scholars.270 Professor Lester
266. Id. at 9–10.
267. Id. at 9.
268. Id. at 10 (citations omitted).
269. Id. at 14.
270. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money
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Brickman, a habitual critic of contingent fees, called the
opinion “a distressing display of ethical insensitivity” to 
lawyers’ alleged “practice of routinely overcharging
contingency fee clients through use of standard contingency
fees in cases without meaningful risk, that is, in cases where 
liability is not in issue and where a substantial reward
yielding an effective fee of thousands of dollars an hour is
virtually assured.”271 
To be sure, the Committee’s reasoning was imperfect in
some respects. For example, the rationale that a lawyer
should be able to receive a contingent fee based on the total
recovery where the client rejects an early settlement offer
even if the eventual recovery does not exceed the amount of
that offer in part because the lawyer risked the client firing
her at will, overlooks the lawyer’s right to recover in
quantum meruit.272 At the same time, the Committee was
correct that defendants offer to settle expediently for reasons
apart from clear liability, and litigation outcomes are
notoriously uncertain. A defendant’s extension of an early
settlement offer assures a plaintiff and her lawyer of nothing
down the road.
There is little authority to guide courts facing these 
issues. The courts in the two reported cases that are arguably
relevant reached different conclusions.
The plaintiff in Corcoran v. Northeast Illinois Regional
Commuter Railroad Corp.,273 Mary Corcoran, was widowed
when her husband Michael, a Union Pacific Railroad worker,
was struck by a Metra commuter train.274 She negotiated
with the railroads and received a $1.4 million settlement
Talks, Ethics Walks, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 247 (1996).
271. Id. at 298.
272. See infra Part VI.
273. 803 N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
274. Id. at 89.
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offer.275 A friend later introduced her to lawyer Joseph Dowd,
who, in turn, referred her to the acclaimed Chicago plaintiffs’
law firm of Corboy & Demetrio.276 She signed a contingent
fee agreement with Corboy & Demetrio that granted the firm
25 percent of any recovery.277 The fee agreement also entitled
Dowd to a referral fee equal to 40 percent of Corboy &
Demetrio’s fee.278 
In August 1999, David Wise of Corboy & Demetrio filed
a wrongful death suit against the railroads, which denied
liability.279 In April 2001, with little having been done in the
case—Wise answered very limited written discovery from the 
railroads and no depositions were taken—Wise 
recommended that Mary accept the railroads’ $1.4 million
settlement offer.280 She did so and the trial court approved
the settlement.281 
Because it did not improve on the settlement offer that
Mary negotiated on her own, Corboy & Demetrio waived its
fee.282 Dowd, however, sought his referral fee, which came to
$140,000.283 Mary argued that Dowd was entitled to no fee
because he did no work and effectively vanished after
referring the case to Corboy & Demetrio.284 The trial court
reasoned that because Dowd’s referral fee met the Illinois
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(g) requirements for dividing
fees between lawyers in different firms and Corboy &





279. Id. at 89–91.





       
 
      
      
        
         
        
         
     
         
      
      
       
        
         
      
        
        
         
      
         
      
       
         
        
       
        
       
 
    
     
     
     
     
     
   
   
   
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 965
was entitled to his $140,000 referral fee.285 
Mary appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois, which
affirmed the trial court.286 The Corcoran court rejected
Mary’s argument that Dowd did not perform sufficient work
to warrant $140,000 in fees; because Dowd sought a referral
fee, he did not need to prove that he had earned it by
providing legal services.287 The contingent fee agreement
was valid.288 The division of fees between Dowd and Corboy
& Demetrio was permitted by Illinois Rule 1.5(g).289 
Furthermore, the fee agreement made no provision for the
railroads’ $1.4 million settlement offer that preceded the 
lawyers’ involvement in the case; rather, Mary simply agreed
to pay Corboy & Demeterio and Dowd a combined 25 percent
of the total amount recovered from the railroads.290 
Mary argued that Corboy & Demetrio’s 25 percent fee 
was unreasonable, which would have made Dowd’s referral
fee unreasonable, but that argument failed for a lack of
evidence in the record.291 Basically, because Mary’s strategy
in the trial court focused on proving that Dowd’s fee was
unreasonable, she did not develop sufficient evidence of
Corboy & Demetrio’s alleged lethargy.292 Once the trial court
concluded that Corboy & Demetrio had earned its fee, Mary
was doomed by the deferential abuse of discretion standard
that the Corcoran court applied to the trial court’s finding.293 
Corcoran is not precisely on point because the court was
able to skirt the issues addressed in Formal Opinion 94-389
285. Id. at 89–90.
286. Id. at 92.
287. Id. at 90.
288. Id. at 92.
289. Id. at 90.
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by focusing on Dowd’s pursuit of a referral fee and the
inadequate record regarding Corboy & Demetrio’s efforts on
the plaintiff’s behalf. But the record was not devoid of
evidence of Corboy & Demetrio’s performance. To the
contrary, it revealed that between August 1999 and April
2001, Wise got Mary Corcoran appointed as special
administrator of Michael’s estate, filed a complaint,
answered the railroads’ affirmative defenses, engaged in
some desultory written discovery, and recommended that
Mary accept the railroads’ preexisting settlement offer.294 In
other words, he did almost nothing. The Corcoran court
nevertheless accepted the trial court’s conclusion that
Corboy & Demetrio “had filed papers needed to protect
Mary’s right to litigate her claim” and that this effort sufficed
to make its contingent fee agreement enforceable.295 It is
therefore reasonable to think that the Corcoran court would
have allowed Corboy & Demetrio to collect its 25 percent
contingent fee without improving on the railroads’ pre-suit
settlement offer had the firm attempted to do so.
The Colorado Supreme Court took an opposing position
in People v. Egbune.296 In that case, Gezachew Ambaw was
injured in an automobile accident and hired lawyer Philip
Cockerille to pursue a claim against the other driver.297 After
extensive work, Cockerille secured a $15,000 settlement offer
from the other driver’s insurer, CNA.298 Ambaw rejected the
offer despite Cockerille’s recommendation to accept it.299 
Cockerille then convinced CNA to increase its offer to 
294. Id. at 89.
295. Id. at 91.
296. 58 P.3d 1168 (Colo. 1999).
297. Id. at 1171.
298. Id.
299. Id. After Ambaw initially declined the offer, Cockerille sent him a lengthy
letter analyzing the case and recommending that he accept the offer. Id. Ambaw
then declined the offer for a second time and increased his settlement demand.
Id.
       
 
       
        
       
    
        
      
       
    
     
       
      
         
       
          
        
  
      
         
   
         
         
        
         
      
        
 
   
   
   
   
     
     
   
   
   
     
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 967
$17,500.300 Ambaw also rejected that offer.301 Truth be told,
Ambaw was up to no good: he had secretly signed a
contingent fee agreement with another lawyer, Patrick
Egbune, just days before.302 
Ambaw fired Cockerille as his lawyer soon after rejecting
CNA’s $17,500 offer.303 Cockerille wrote to CNA and Egbune
to assert a lien on any payment to Ambaw.304 
Over the next three weeks, Egbune unsuccessfully
attempted to persuade CNA to offer more than $17,500.305 
When CNA refused, Ambaw accepted the $17,500 offer.306 
Egbune finalized the settlement without telling Cockerille
and pocketed a 35 percent contingent fee of $6,122.307 When
Cockerille finally learned about the settlement from CNA, he 
sued CNA to enforce his lien but lost.308 He still might have
fared better than Egbune, who landed in disciplinary
authorities’ crosshairs.
A presiding disciplinary judge found that Egbune had
violated Rule 1.5(a) by collecting an unreasonable fee.309 As
the Egbune court explained:
By his own admission, Egbune, over the course of a three-week
period, did no more than make a few phone calls to the insurance 
adjuster, meet with his client, examine some medical treatment
records and do some research at the law library to determine the
reasonable range of settlement for claims similar to 





304. Id. at 1171–72.




309. Id. at 1173–74.
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which Egbune advised his client to accept, had already been
offered . . . through Cockerille before Egbune began his
representation. Egbune’s work did not enhance the value of
Ambaw’s claim, nor did it expedite the receipt of the settlement
proceeds. Although Egbune may be entitled to some fee for the
services he performed, a full contingent fee of 35 % cannot be
reasonable when Egbune did little more than accept the offer which
CNA had already extended to the client through [Cockerille].310 
The court further concluded that Egbune had violated
several other ethics rules by disbursing the settlement funds
despite knowing of Cockerille’s lien, by not telling Cockerille
of the settlement, and by potentially exposing Ambaw to 
liability for Cockerille’s fee.311 Upon a final tally, the
Colorado Supreme Court suspended Egbune from practice
for six months.312 
Egbune presents a slightly different situation from those
discussed in Formal Opinion 94-389 because it involved two 
lawyers and the early settlement offer in the case followed
substantial effort by Cockerille. That said, the court’s basis
for criticizing Egbune’s fee has to be understood as a rejection
of the ABA’s position.
C. Summary and Synthesis 
If a lawyer makes an early settlement offer and the 
defendant accepts it, or if the defendant makes an early
settlement offer and the lawyer’s client accepts it, the lawyer
generally will be entitled to collect her full contingent fee.313 
It is less clear whether a lawyer should recover her full
contingent fee where the defendant makes an early
settlement offer that the client initially rejects but later
accepts, or that the client rejects and later improves upon by
310. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
311. Id. at 1173–75.
312. Id. at 1176.
313. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-389, at
7–8 (1994).
       
 
       
       
       
     
        
         
    
         
        
       
          
       
        
          
      
          
          
        
 
        
         
      
     
         
        
       
        
       
 
          
               
          
        
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 969
way of settlement or judgment. The reasonableness of a 
lawyer’s contingent fee in the latter two situations likely
depends on the facts. A court’s willingness to approve a
lawyer’s full contingent fee should increase as the difference 
between the amount of the early settlement offer and the
amount of any final settlement offer or judgment increases.
To illustrate this point, compare two hypothetical cases.
In Case 1, the client receives an early settlement offer of
$100,000 and rejects it, and the lawyer subsequently settles
the case at mediation for $105,000. In Case 2, the client
receives an early settlement offer of $100,000 and rejects it,
and months later the lawyer negotiates a $300,000
settlement. Allowing the lawyer to collect a contingent fee
based on the total recovery seems much fairer in Case 2,
where her services plainly were valuable to the client. The
lawyer in Case 1 is entitled to some reward for her efforts
and assumption of risk, but a court may well conclude that
the lawyer should receive far less than her full contingent
fee.314 
III. CONTINGENT FEES AND STATUTORY FEES: A MOSTLY 
COMFORTABLE COEXISTENCE 
Under the so-called “American Rule”, each party bears
its own attorneys’ fees unless a contract or statute provides
otherwise.315 Statutory fee-shifting is a recurring
consideration for plaintiffs’ lawyers, who frequently charge 
contingent fees in cases in which their clients may receive 
statutory fee awards if they prevail. For example, plaintiffs
who prevail in federal civil rights and employment
discrimination actions may recover their attorneys’ fees as
an element of costs.316 Various state statutes also provide
314. See Egbune, 58 P.3d at 1173–74 (expressing this view).
315. Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015) (quoting
Hardt v. Reliance Std. Life Ins., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010)).
316. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988(b), 2000e-5(k) (2006).
      
 
        
     
       
 
             
                
             
               
              
              
           
             
              
           
            
                
               
              
          
             
         
             
            
                  
             
           
             
             
            
           
                 
           
             
            
               
               
              
              
              
            
               
                
           
           
             
         
970 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
that successful plaintiffs may recover attorneys’ fees.317 The
right to receive a fee award belongs to the client—not to the 
lawyer.318 The client may negotiate, settle, or waive the right
317. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.428(a) (2016) (“Upon the rendition of a judgment
or decree by any of the courts of this state against an insurer and in favor of any
named or omnibus insured or the named beneficiary under a policy or contract
executed by the insurer, the trial court or, in the event of an appeal in which the 
insured or beneficiary prevails, the appellate court shall adjudge or decree . . . in
favor of the insured or beneficiary a reasonable sum as fees or compensation for
the insured’s or beneficiary’s attorney. . . .”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 8.31(3)(a) (West
2016) (“[A]ny person injured by a violation of any of the laws referred to in sub-
division 1 may bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs and
disbursements, including . . . reasonable attorney’s fees. . . .”); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
6-21.1(a) (2016) (“In any personal injury or property damage suit, or suit against
an insurance company under a policy . . . in which the insured or beneficiary is
the plaintiff . . . upon findings by the court (i) that there was an unwarranted
refusal by the defendant to negotiate or pay the claim which constitutes the basis
of such suit, (ii) that the amount of damages recovered is twenty-five thousand
dollars ($25,000) or less, and (iii) that the amount of damages recovered exceeded
the highest offer made by the defendant no later than 90 days before the com-
mencement of trial, the presiding judge may . . . allow a reasonable attorneys’
fees to the . . . attorneys representing the litigant obtaining a judgment for dam-
ages in said suit . . . as a part of the court costs. The attorneys’ fees so awarded
shall not exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000).”); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 541 § 
541.152(a)(1) (West 2011) (providing for the award of “court costs and reasonable
and necessary attorney’s fees” in addition to actual damages in an action alleging
an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the 
business of insurance); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (West 2008)
(“A person may recover reasonable attorney’s fees from an individual or corpora-
tion, in addition to the amount of a valid claim and costs, if the claim is for: (1)
rendered services; (2) performed labor; (3) furnished material; (4) freight or ex-
press overcharges; (5) lost or damaged freight or express; (6) killed or injured
stock; (7) a sworn account; or (8) an oral or written contract.”).
318. Cambridge Tr. Co. v. Hanify & King P.C., 721 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Mass. 1999);
State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Weeks, 1998 OK 83, ¶ 25, 969 P.2d 347, 354;
Murrco Agency, Inc. v. Ryan, 800 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex. App. 1990); Heldreth v.
Rahimian, 637 S.E.2d 359, 368 (W. Va. 2006); Gorton v. Hostak, Henzl & Bichler,
S.C., 577 N.W.2d 617, 621–23 (Wis. 1998); see also Pony v. Cty. of Los Angeles,
433 F.3d 1138, 1142 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Once the prevailing party exercises her
right to receive fees, the attorney’s right to collect them vests, and he may then
pursue them on his own. . . . Unless and until the party exercises this power,
however, the attorney has no right to collect fees from the non-prevailing party,
and the non-prevailing party has no duty to pay them.” (citation omitted)). But
see Flannery v. Prentice, 28 P.3d 860, 871 (Cal. 2001) (concluding that attorneys’
fees “awarded pursuant to [the California Fair Employment and Housing Act]
       
 
   
     
       
     
         
        
     
        
         
      
        
      
       
        
         
       
     
 
         
      
 
           
        
             
             
                  
                
            
              
            
              
        
            
 
              
           
           
             
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 971
to recover attorneys’ fees.319 
Contingent fee agreements and statutory fee awards
comfortably coexist. The ground rules in cases where they
meet are for the most part well-established.
If a contingent fee agreement is ambiguous or silent as
to how the parties will account for a statutory fee award,
courts tend to calculate the contingent fee based on the 
amount of the judgment exclusive of any fee award, and then
credit the statutory fee award to the client as an offset
against the contingent fee owed to the lawyer.320 Under this
approach, the lawyer should receive the greater of (1) the
contingent fee calculated solely on the amount of the damage 
award or (2) the amount of the statutory fee.321 
The lawyer and client could, of course, expressly agree
that if the client prevails and is awarded attorneys’ fees, the 
lawyer will receive the greater of the contingent fee or the fee 
award.322 This agreement must be made before the case’s
judgment.323 
In the odd case in which the plaintiff prevails and is
awarded attorneys’ fees but the court awards no damages— 
(exceeding fees already paid) belong, absent an enforceable agreement to the con-
trary, to the attorneys who labored to earn them”).
319. Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 88 (1990); Cambridge Tr. Co., 721
N.E.2d at 6; Okla. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Counsel, Ethics Op. 325 (2009).
320. Com. Union Ins. Co. v. Est. of Plute, 356 So. 2d 54, 55–56 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); Cambridge Tr. Co., 721 N.E.2d at 7; Albunio v. City of N.Y., 11 N.E.3d
1104, 1109–10 (N.Y. 2014) (quoting 1 ROBERT L. ROSSI, ATTORNEYS’ FEES § 2:12,
at 37–38 (3d ed. 2013)); Ash v. Traynor, 2000 ND 75, ¶ 9, 609 N.W.2d 96, 99;
Luna v. Gillingham, 789 P.2d 801, 805 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990); Heldreth, 637
S.E.2d at 369 n.16; Okla. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Counsel, Ethics Op. 325 (2009).
321. Cambridge Tr. Co., 721 N.E.2d at 7; Albunio, 11 N.E.3d at 1109–11 (quot-
ing ROSSI, § 2:12, at 37–38); Okla. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Counsel, Ethics Op. 325
(2009).
322. See, e.g., Kaufman v. MacDonald, 557 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1990) (recog-
nizing that this arrangement overcame Florida law holding that a statutory fee 
award cannot exceed the amount owed under a contingent fee agreement).
323. Lugassy v. Indep. Fire Ins., 636 So. 2d 1332, 1335 (Fla. 1994).
      
 
       
        
       
        
      
          
        
       
         
      
       
        
          
      
         
        
       
          
 
              
            
        
     
             
              
         
               
            
        
         
             
        
              
             
           
              
          
            
            
         
             
972 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
perhaps because the plaintiff wins only injunctive relief or
because the court or jury simply finds that the plaintiff was
not damaged—the plaintiff should receive the attorneys’ fee
award and the lawyer’s contingent fee should be based on
that award.324 Thus, if the court awarded the plaintiff
$150,000 in statutory attorneys’ fees in a case in which the
plaintiff was awarded no damages, and the lawyer charged a
one-third contingent fee based on the client’s gross recovery, 
the lawyer would be entitled to a fee of $50,000. Again, this
scenario assumes that the fee agreement is ambiguous or
silent on the treatment of any statutory fee award.
A contingent fee agreement does not impose a cap or
ceiling on the amount of statutory attorney’s fees that a court
may award,325 or alone determine the amount or
reasonableness of a fee award,326 nor does a statutory fee
award limit a lawyer’s right to a reasonable contingent fee.327 
Where the parties’ fee agreement is ambiguous or silent on
the issue, a lawyer may not recover both her full contingent
324. See Stair v. Turtzo, Spry, Sbrocchi, Faul & Labarre, 768 A.2d 299, 307–08 
(Pa. 2001) (denying summary judgment to the defendant law firm and allowing
the plaintiff-client to pursue the recovery of her statutory fee award less the con-
tingent fee to which she agreed).
325. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96 (1989); Cambridge Tr. Co., 721
N.E.2d at 6; 650 N. Main Ass’n v. Frauenshuh, Inc., 885 N.W.2d 478, 495–96
(Minn. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 96).
326. See, e.g., Ga. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Couch, 759 S.E.2d 804, 815–16 (Ga. 2014)
(explaining this principle in concluding that the trial court erred in calculating
the reasonableness of the amount of fees to be awarded to an inmate-plaintiff
under a Georgia statute based solely on the inmate-plaintiff’s contingent fee
agreement with his lawyers rather than on evidence of the hours expended, rates,
or other indications regarding the value of the lawyers’ professional services).
327. Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 89–90 (1990); Young v. Alden Gardens
of Waterford, LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 131887, ¶100, 30 N.E.3d 631, 654–55; Cam-
bridge Tr. Co., 721 N.E.2d at 6. But see First Baptist Church of Cape Coral, Fla.,
Inc. v. Compass Constr., Inc., 115 So. 3d 978, 981–83 (Fla. 2013) (recognizing the
rule that absent a contrary contractual provision, a statutory fee award cannot
exceed the fees due under the parties’ fee agreement); Career Concepts, Inc. v.
Synergy, Inc., 865 N.E.2d 385, 394–95 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (reducing the plaintiff’s
fee award under a contractual fee shifting provision to the amount of the contin-
gent fee the plaintiff’s law firm was entitled to receive under its fee agreement).
       
 
         
        
          
        
         
       
         
      
    
      
        
      
         
        
   
        
          
         
            
 
              
               
        
            
 
              
            
               
               
            
          
           
                
              
          
             
     
         
               
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 973
fee and the full amount of a statutory fee award.328 Such a
combined fee would be unreasonable.329 The lawyer must be
content with the larger of the contingent fee or the statutory
award. There is, however, authority for the proposition that
a lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer is entitled to 
receive both her contingent fee and any statutory fee 
award.330 If such an agreement seems overly generous to the
lawyer, remember that the total fee still must be
reasonable.331 The client may challenge the reasonableness
of the fee despite having agreed to it in the contingent fee 
agreement.332 In fact, unless the results achieved for the
client were “extremely favorable” and the matter required
significant work, a lawyer’s collection of her full contingent
fee plus the full statutory fee ordinarily will yield a clearly
excessive fee that violates Rule 1.5(a).333 
A client and lawyer may contractually agree that a
contingent fee will be based on a percentage of the combined
amount of the judgment in the case plus any statutory award
of attorneys’ fees.334 Thus, and by way of example, in a case
328. Ash v. Traynor, 2000 ND 75, ¶ 9, 609 N.W.2d 96, 99; State ex rel. Okla.
Bar Ass’n v. Weeks, 1998 OK 83, ¶¶ 37–42, 969 P.2d 347, 356-57; Heldreth v.
Rahimian, 637 S.E.2d 359, 369 (W. Va. 2006).
329. Weeks, 1998 OK 83, ¶¶ 42–44, 969 P.2d at 357; Heldreth, 637 S.E.2d at
369.
330. See, e.g., Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632, 643 (7th Cir.
2011) (noting that “the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that a plaintiff
is free to contract with her attorney to pay a contingent fee in addition to assign-
ing rights to the statutory fee”); Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 245 F. Supp. 2d
162, 173 (D. Me. 2003) (“As regards the 25% fee coupled with the assignment of
statutory fees, the arrangement [was] reasonable in light of [the lawyer’s] exten-
sive civil rights litigation experience, the complexity of Plaintiff’s case and his
success at trial.”); Dowles v. ConAgra, Inc., 25 So. 3d 889, 892 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
331. See Dowles, 25 So. 3d at 897–99 (scrutinizing such a fee for reasonable-
ness); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
332. Cambridge Tr. Co., 721 N.E.2d at 6–7; Okla. Bar Ass’n, Legal Ethics
Counsel, Ethics Op. 325 (2009).
333. N.C. State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 4 (2002).
334. Cambridge Tr. Co., 721 N.E.2d at 6; Untiedt v. Grand Labs., Inc., 552
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in which the court entered a $500,000 judgment for the client
and awarded the client $100,000 in attorneys’ fees, the 
lawyer could receive her fee from the client’s $600,000 total
recovery if her fee agreement clearly provided for that
calculation. If the lawyer charged a one-third gross
contingent fee, she would then collect $200,000. The same 
result might follow if the fee agreement stated that the
lawyer would be entitled to one-third of any “gross amount
recovered” or “gross recovery” but did not mention a
statutory fee award.335 
Despite courts’ general willingness to allow clients to 
knowingly enter into a variety of contingent fee agreements,
the right to recover fees from an adversary can add wrinkles
to the attorney-client relationship. Consider a fee agreement
in which the lawyer grants herself “the option of taking
either the 40% contingent fee from the gross recovery or the
attorneys’ fees awarded or negotiated.”336 In other words, the
agreement contemplates the lawyer negotiating her fees
directly with the defendant.
This provision raises serious conflict of interest
concerns.337 Imagine a case in which the lawyer persuades
her client to accept a lower settlement than the facts of the 
case warrant so that the lawyer may negotiate a higher fee 
N.W.2d 571, 575 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); Williamson v. Belovich, 617 N.E.2d 786,
789 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); N.C. State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 4 (2002); Okla. Bar
Ass’n Legal Ethics Counsel, Ethics Op. 325 (2009).
335. See, e.g., Gorton v. Hostak, Henzl & Bichler, S.C., 577 N.W.2d 617, 622– 
24 (Wis. 1998) (upholding this result over the law firm’s protest that it should
receive its 40 percent contingent fee plus the attorneys’ fees awarded to the cli-
ent).
336. I was asked about the propriety of language nearly identical to this by 
another lawyer, who shall remain anonymous.
337. See, e.g., Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., 722 F.2d 1009, 1011 (2d Cir. 1983)
(discussing attorneys’ fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and stating that
“[w]here an attorney and client have independent entitlements in the same action
a conflict of interest is created”); Ramirez v. Sturdevant, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 554,
562–66 (Ct. App. 1994) (discussing the inherent conflict in dual settlement nego-
tiations).
       
 
        
        
        
      
        
         
       
       
       
      
          
       
       
 
     
     
     
        
       
   
    
         
        
      
         
        
 
     
              
           
         
 
             
             
      
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 975
with the defendant. Next, consider a case in which the client
agrees on the settlement amount that he is to receive but the
defendant and lawyer cannot agree on the lawyer’s fees. If
the defendant will not settle absent full agreement, the 
client’s right to settle will be thwarted.338 Even if the client
can persuade a court to void the fee agreement under Model
Rule 1.2(a), such a strategy will complicate and prolong the 
litigation, perhaps spawn new litigation, potentially burden
the client with additional attorneys’ fees, and incurably
fracture what is likely an already brittle attorney-client
relationship. In the end, the most that can be said for dual
negotiation provisions like this one is that, while they are not
necessarily invalid or unethical, they require careful case-by-
case evaluation.339 
Finally, the message for lawyers is straightforward:
where applicable, clearly provide for the treatment of
attorneys’ fee awards in contingent fee agreements.
Conjunctively, lawyers must explain to clients how they will
allocate statutory fees and contingent fees in cases where 
there is a fee award.340 
IV. GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED CONTINGENT FEE LITIGATION 
One of the more interesting contingent fee controversies
in recent years has been public entities’ ability to retain
lawyers on a contingent fee basis to represent them in
litigation against private parties. Consider the case of a
municipal government in a city with a major industrial
district. One of the chemical companies there stores a toxic
338. Brown, 722 F.2d at 1011.
339. See, e.g., Ramirez, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 566 (“[T]he better approach is to
consider each case on its own merits. We therefore decline to find that the inher-
ent conflict in dual negotiations necessarily invalidates any resulting settle-
ments.”).
340. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“A
lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”).
      
 
       
     
      
      
      
         
            
       
      
       
     
      
       
    
        
     
        
      
        
      
       
         
 
             
            
 
               
               
             
        
                 
          
               
            
          
          
              
           
     
976 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
compound in large outdoor tanks. When one of the tanks
ruptures, the compound pours into the nearby river
upstream from the local water works, contaminating the 
city’s water supply. The city wants to sue the chemical
company for the contamination. Unfortunately, the city does
not have the legal staff to pursue the action itself, and hiring
a law firm to represent it on an hourly basis would wreck its
budget. The city therefore hires a prominent plaintiff’s law
firm to sue the manufacturer on a contingent fee basis.
This would appear to be an ideal arrangement: the city
will be able to pursue essential public nuisance litigation
without incurring the huge out-of-pocket expense that would
accompany a lawsuit prosecuted by lawyers who charge by
the hour.341 Outside counsel may also have necessary
expertise that the city’s lawyers do not.342 In fact, courts have
long accepted contingent fee representations where a
governmental entity acts as a traditional plaintiff suing to 
recover damages for some type of injury.343 The calculus
changes, however, when the government acts in its sovereign
capacity as parens patriae to pursue consumer protection,
eminent domain, public nuisance, or similar litigation,
rather than functioning as a traditional plaintiff.344 When a
341. As in any other case, the private lawyers’ contingent fee must be reason-
able under Rule 1.5(a). State v. Hagerty, 1998 ND 122, ¶ 29, 580 N.W.2d 139,
148.
342. Int’l Paper Co. v. Harris Cty., 445 S.W.3d 379, 396 (Tex. App. 2013).
343. See, e.g., City of San Francisco v. Philip Morris, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1130,
1135 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (“This lawsuit, which is basically a fraud action, does not
raise concerns analogous to those in the public nuisance or eminent domain con-
texts. . . . Plaintiffs’ role in this suit is that of a tort victim, rather than a sover-
eign seeking to vindicate the rights of its residents or exercising governmental
powers.”); see also Cty. of Santa Clara v. Super. Ct., 235 P.3d 21, 33–34 (Cal.
2010) (explaining that public entities clearly may employ private counsel on a
contingent fee basis when “the governmental entity’s interests in the litigation
are those of an ordinary party, rather than those of the public”).
344. See David M. Axelrad & Lisa Perrochet, The Supreme Court of California
Rules on Santa Clara Contingency Fee Issue—Backpedals on Clancy, 78 DEF.
COUNS. J. 331, 334 (2011).
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governmental plaintiff is acting as a sovereign, its lawyers
are expected to be neutral in the way that a criminal
prosecutor is neutral; that is, as government representatives
they “must act with the impartiality required of those who
govern,” and they must avoid abusing the government’s vast
power.345 
These arrangements are often criticized. Analogizing, no 
district attorney could survive paying prosecutors based on
the criminal cases they won.346 Similarly, a court would
disqualify any prosecutor who pursued a public nuisance 
case for a contingent fee—the prosecutor’s financial interest
in the outcome of the litigation would be intolerable.347 By
extension, so the argument goes, the rules should be the 
same when a public entity hires private lawyers to pursue
what amounts to a law enforcement action for a contingent
fee.348 As two excellent California lawyers have argued:
The same potential for erosion of the government’s neutrality and
impartiality occurs whether a contingent fee is payable to the
government or the government’s agent. Either way, day-to-day
litigation decisions . . . are all necessarily colored by the inescapable 
fact that counsel hired to litigate the case will not be paid unless
there is a substantial monetary recovery. That profit motive
necessarily influences the course of the litigation. Where a
contingent fee is involved, therefore, there is no longer a guarantee
that a public law enforcement action will be guided solely b what is
best for the general welfare. There will always be a risk that
decisions concerning government parens patriae litigation will be 
made in whole or in part for the sake of attorney profit rather than
for the public’s benefit.
The issue is not whether an advocate can be perfectly
disinterested. All advocates have an interest in winning. . . . The
neutrality demanded of an attorney enforcing public rights does not
require complete indifference to the outcome of the case. However,
when [that] attorney has a financial stake in the outcome of that
345. Cty. of Santa Clara, 235 P.3d at 29.
346. Axelrad & Perrochet, supra note 344, at 334.
347. Id.
348. Id.
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case, the potential for the attorney to act out of self-interest rather
than the public interest creates an indelible appearance of
impropriety.349 
Valid though these concerns may be, they are
surmountable. Courts generally let public entities hire 
contingent fee counsel to prosecute parens patriae actions as
long as they take certain precautions.350 These precautions
are thought to be necessary because lawyers prosecuting
such actions, while not subject to the stringent conflict of
interest rules governing criminal prosecutors’ conduct, “are
subject to a heightened standard of ethical conduct
applicable to public officials acting in the name of the
public—standards that would not be invoked in an ordinary
civil case.”351 
First, a public entity may retain private lawyers on a
contingent fee basis if “neutral, conflict-free government
attorneys retain the power to control and supervise the 
litigation.”352 This means that government lawyers must
make all critical discretionary decisions regarding the 
conduct of the litigation,353 they must have veto power over
all decisions made by the private lawyers,354 and a senior
government lawyer must be involved in all stages of the
349. Id. at 334–35.
350. See, e.g., City of Chi. v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 14 C 4361, 2015 WL
920719, at *4–6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2015); Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Conway,
861 F. Supp. 2d 802, 814–16 (E.D. Ky. 2012) (Merck I); Cty. of Santa Clara, 235
P.3d at 35–41; Philip Morris Inc. v. Glendening, 709 A.2d 1230, 1242–43 (Md.
1998); State v. Actavis Pharma, Inc., __ A.3d __, 2017 WL 2830715, at *5 (N.H.
June 30, 2017); State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 477 (R.I. 2008);
Int’l Paper Co. v. Harris Cty., 445 S.W.3d 379, 394–97 (Tex. App. 2013); State ex 
rel. Discover Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nibert, 744 S.E.2d 625, 634–40 (W. Va. 2013).
But see Meredith v. Ieyoub, 700 So. 2d 478, 484 (La. 1997) (“Until the Legislature
enacts a statute authorizing the Attorney General to enter into contingency fee 
contracts, the Contract is invalid and may not be implemented or enforced.”).
351. Cty. of Santa Clara, 235 P.3d at 35.
352. Id. at 36.
353. Id. at 38–39.
354. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d at 477.
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litigation.355 
These requirements are tempered by reason.356 The
private lawyers must have room to exercise their
professional skills.357 They must be empowered to make the
routine ministerial decisions common to litigation without
having to check with the government lawyers to whom they
report.358 As long as government lawyers are directing the
litigation, making all critical decisions in the case, and
reviewing the private lawyers’ work before adopting or
approving it, the control requirement is satisfied.359 
Government lawyers need not be intimately involved in all
of the daily activities or decisions that power litigation to be 
in control of the case.360 Indeed, to require government
lawyers to know every detail of a case or to be involved in the 
nitty-gritty work in the matter would be impractical, as a
Kentucky federal court explained when discussing the 
Kentucky Attorney General’s control of the state’s lawsuit
against a drug manufacturer:
Lack of involvement in the legwork of a case does not prove or even
imply a lack of control. The legal system would cease to function
efficiently if the person with ultimate control over a case was
required not only to oversee and approve all the actions taken in the 
matter, but also take part in every minute detail of those actions.
The [Attorney General] need not be involved in the day-to-day work
done in all the cases being prosecuted by his office. Indeed, it would
be virtually impossible for him to do so. It is similarly illogical to
require [the Assistant Attorney General serving as the lead
government lawyer in the case] to take part in the in-depth work
355. Id.
356. See, e.g., Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Conway, 947 F. Supp. 2d 733,
748 (E.D. Ky. 2013) (Merck II) (concluding that the Kentucky Attorney General’s
office satisfied the control requirement even though it was not intimately in-
volved in all the routine work or everyday decision-making common in litigation).
357. See id. (declining to second guess the Attorney General’s approach to man-
aging the litigation).
358. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d at 476 n.51.
359. Merck II, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 748.
360. Id.
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that the contingency-fee counsel was hired to do. This would not
only be too onerous a standard for “maintaining control over the 
litigation,” it would also defeat the purpose of hiring outside counsel
to begin with.361 
The party challenging the government’s control over the
litigation—or, more precisely, its lack thereof—bears the 
burden of establishing that the government lawyers have 
abdicated their responsibilities to the private lawyers.362 It
is not the government’s burden to prove that it is controlling
the case.363 Government lawyers whose conduct is challenged
are entitled to a presumption that they are fulfilling their
professional responsibilities.364 
Critics of contingent fees in this context contend that the 
control mandate cannot ensure private lawyers’ neutrality
and impartiality because “the development and evaluation of
facts are all necessarily influenced by the inescapable fact
that private counsel with tremendous responsibility for
litigating a public law enforcement action will not be paid
unless there is a substantial monetary recovery.”365 The
private lawyers’ profit motive “necessarily influences the
course of litigation in the direction of monetary solutions
rather than nonmonetary or governmental solutions that
may be available.”366 In other words, the private lawyers’
pervasive desire to earn a contingent fee will cause them to
conduct the litigation in a fashion that overrides the
government lawyers’ ability or will to manage the litigation.
This argument assumes too much. To start, it appears to 
assume either that “nonmonetary or governmental
solutions” are generally preferable to money damages, or
361. Id.
362. Id. at 744.
363. See id.
364. Id.
365. Axelrad & Perrochet, supra note 344, at 343.
366. Id.
       
 
          
         
          
       
        
        
         
      
      
      
         
     
        
      
     
      
     
     
       
      
         
      
         
       
         
  
       
         
       
        
       
 
               
   
           
   
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 981
that the public entity does not or should not want to recover
damages. If the public entity is suing for monetary damages
that probably is a good sign that damages are the relief it
considers appropriate. A monetary award may be the only
way of making the public entity whole, and government
officials may prefer a damage award over injunctive or other
relief. In any event, the government officials responsible for
hiring outside counsel or the senior government lawyers
responsible for supervising the private attorneys, or both,
surely discussed those issues with the private lawyers when
they agreed on the objectives of the litigation. They also 
surely discussed an alternative compensation arrangement
for the lawyers if injunctive or other non-monetary relief was
a foreseeable outcome. The argument certainly seems to give
little credit to the government lawyers responsible for the 
litigation, who presumably will “honor their obligation to 
place the interests of their client above the personal,
pecuniary interest[s] of the subordinate private counsel they
have hired.”367 The argument gives even less credit to the
private lawyers involved, who should be expected “to comport
themselves with ethical integrity and to abide by all rules of
professional conduct.”368 In sum, the solution to concerns
about actual control by government lawyers is not to
abstractly brand it impracticable, but for defendants to prove 
that government lawyers have failed in their duty of control
in appropriate cases.
Another complaint about the control requirement is that
it is illusory.369 After all, the government entity is hiring
contingent fee counsel because it does not have the personnel
or resources to prosecute the action itself.370 How then can a
government lawyer’s assurance that she is in control of the 
367. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Super. Ct., 235 P.3d 21, 38 (Cal. 2010).
368. Id.
369. See Axelrad & Perrochet, supra note 344, at 337.
370. Id.
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litigation be relied upon?371 And how can suitable control be
verified without intruding into the public entity’s attorney-
client privilege and its lawyers’ work product immunity?372 
These are valid questions.
The claim that control cannot be assured given the public
entity’s inability to pursue the case itself overlooks the 
reality of litigation management. On a daily basis,
corporations litigate matters through outside counsel
supervised by in-house counsel. Corporations hire outside 
lawyers because they do not have the personnel or expertise 
to litigate the matters themselves, yet no one would suggest
that the in-house lawyers cannot control the litigation. There 
is no reason to view affairs differently where an in-house
lawyer is employed by a public entity rather than by a
corporation. Again, “control” does not require an in-house 
lawyer’s immersion in the daily conduct of the litigation.373 
Because it does not, a court’s need to verify governmental
control should not intrude into the public entity’s privileged
communications or its lawyers’ work product.374 Moreover,
this claim conflates knowledge and control. This is improper
because “knowledge and control are distinct concepts, and an
attorney can control litigation without knowing every detail 
of the case.”375 
As for verifying the truth of a government lawyer’s claim
that she is controlling the litigation, there rarely should be 
any need for such verification. The one court that appears to 
have been presented with that task to date had no trouble 
doing so without infringing the government’s attorney-client
371. Id. (calling a government lawyer’s assurance that she is in control of liti-
gation “a thin reed”).
372. Id.
373. Merck II, 947 F. Supp. 2d 733, 748 (E.D. Ky. 2013).
374. See id. at 747–48 (rejecting Merck’s attempt “to graft a ‘substantive’ re-
quirement onto the control-of-litigation principles outlined in Lead Industries
and Santa Clara”).
375. Id. at 745 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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privilege or its outside lawyers’ work product immunity.376 
And, at the risk of beating a dead horse, a court can at least
initially rely on a government lawyer’s assurance that she is
in control because of her ethical obligations and her duties to 
her employer.377 
In addition to requiring that government lawyers be in
control of the litigation with the private lawyers in a
subordinate role, it is also important that the government
lawyers appear to the governmental entity’s constituents
and to the public at large to be in control of the litigation.378 
Hence, the second safeguard: the retainer agreement
between the public entity and private counsel must specify
the entity’s right to control the litigation.379 The retainer
agreement must include statements assuring any reader
that (1) government lawyers will control the course and
conduct of the litigation; (2) government lawyers shall have
veto power over all decisions made by outside counsel; and
(3) a senior government lawyer will be personally involved in
supervising the litigation.380 These terms are minimum
requirements.381 They are not exclusive or exhaustive;
different cases may require different or additional guidelines
to ensure an appropriate level of government control.382 
There is no magic language that must be included in a
376. See generally id. at 744–49 (discussing the Kentucky Attorney General’s
control of the litigation).
377. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Super. Ct., 235 P.3d 21, 38 (Cal. 2010).
378. State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 477 (R.I. 2008).
379. Cty. of Santa Clara, 235 P.3d at 40; Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d at
477.
380. Cty. of Santa Clara, 235 P.3d at 40; Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d at
477.
381. Cty. of Santa Clara, 235 P.3d at 40; Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d at
477.
382. Cty. of Santa Clara, 235 P.3d at 40; Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d at
477 n.52.
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retainer agreement to satisfy the control requirement.383 
Certainly, the agreement does not need to outline the 
respective daily duties of the government and private 
lawyers.384 
Third, the decision to settle the litigation must be vested
exclusively in the public entity.385 The contingent fee
agreement between the public entity and the private lawyers
must specifically provide that settlement decisions “are 
reserved exclusively to the discretion of the public entity’s
own attorneys.”386 At least one court has ruled that the
agreement must state that the public entity may resolve the 
case through non-monetary relief without the private 
lawyers’ consent.387 The agreement must further state that a 
defendant may communicate directly with the lead
government lawyers without first having to confer with, or
obtain the permission of, the private lawyers.388 
As a matter of professional responsibility, these 
settlement-related requirements are unnecessary. The 
decision to settle on any terms is the public entity’s alone to 
make regardless of what the contingent fee agreement
says.389 The defense lawyers would have the right to
communicate with the government lawyers on the case 
without the presence or permission of the private lawyers
383. See, e.g., Merck II, 947 F. Supp. 2d 733, 740–44 (E.D. Ky. 2013) (upholding
the disputed contingent fee agreements); Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Colum-
bus, No. C2-06-829, 2007 WL 2079774, at *1–2 (S.D. Ohio July 18, 2007) (approv-
ing contingent fee agreements between two cities and outside counsel and disap-
proving of agreement between Toledo and outside counsel where agreement
prohibited Toledo from disposing of a claim without consent of outside counsel).
384. Merck II, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 742.
385. Cty. of Santa Clara, 235 P.3d at 39.
386. Id.
387. Sherwin-Williams Co., 2007 WL 2079774, at *4.
388. Cty. of Santa Clara, 235 P.3d at 39–40 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics &
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-443 (2006)).
389. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
       
 
        
      
     
          
  
         
        
      
       
     
        
       
       
          
        
         
       
       
      
       
        
 
           
   
             
             
      
             
   
          
 
             
             
           
            
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 985
even if the contingent fee agreement was silent on the
issue.390 To the extent that appearances count, however,
these conditions assure concerned observers that settlement
decisions will be driven by public interest rather than by the
private lawyers’ ambitions.
V. REVERSE CONTINGENT FEES 
As we have seen up to this point, courts and lawyers tend
to think of contingent fees in connection with the
representation of plaintiffs. But lawyers may also be 
compensated based on a contingency when representing
defendants.391 These fees are described as “reverse
contingent fees.”392 A reverse contingent fee is based on the
difference between the amount a plaintiff seeks from a
lawyer’s client and the amount ultimately obtained from the 
client, whether by way of settlement or judgment.393 That is,
a reverse contingent fee is based on the amount of money the 
lawyer saves the client rather than the amount of money the
lawyer recovers for the client.394 Reverse contingent fees have
long been charged by lawyers who handle tax appeals, where 
the fee is based on the difference between the amount
originally assessed by the taxing authority and the hopefully
lower amount ultimately determined by a court or
390. DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND ET AL., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN LITIGATION
275–78 (2d ed. 2016).
391. This Part is adapted from Douglas R. Richmond, Reverse Contingent Fees
in Litigation, IN-HOUSE DEF. Q., Spring 2012, at 26. All text has been updated
and remains the author’s original work.
392. ABA Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-373,
at 1 (1993).
393. D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 347 (2009), https://www.dcbar.org/bar-
resources/legal-ethics/opinions/opinion347.cfm.
394. See, e.g., Storino, Ramello & Durkin v. Rackow, 45 N.E.3d 307, 312–13 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (enforcing a reverse contingent fee agreement in a case in
which the lawyers persuaded a municipality to dismiss a special assessment law-
suit after several years of litigation, thereby realizing a savings for the clients).
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administrative body.395 
Reverse contingent fees are generally permissible.396 
Like traditional contingent fees, they must be reasonable,
and the agreements providing for them must meet all other
applicable Model Rule 1.5 requirements.397 
A. Determining Reasonableness 
The critical questions in most reverse contingent fee
representations will relate to the reasonableness of the fee.
The problem is calculating the amount against which the 
client’s potential savings—and thus any fee—will be 
measured. This is a simple task in a case where the plaintiff’s
damages are liquidated and it therefore pleads a sum certain
in its complaint or petition. There is nothing speculative 
about the plaintiff’s damages then.398 In most cases,
however, the plaintiff’s damages are unliquidated.
Furthermore, plaintiffs frequently allege excessive 
damages.399 Thus, the amount sought in a plaintiff’s
complaint or petition, or claimed in a demand letter,
generally cannot alone furnish the number from which any
savings will be calculated.400 Furthermore, in some
jurisdictions, a plaintiff is not required or is not permitted to
395. See, e.g., Brown & Sturm v. Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 768 A.2d 62, 71
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001).
396. ABA Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-373,
at 1 (1993); D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 347 (2009).
397. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 21, § 1.5-3(i), at 206.
398. Iowa Supreme Court Bd. Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, Op. 98-03 (1998),
http://www.iowabar.org/default.asp?page=ethics.
399. See ABA Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-
373, at 4 (1993) (observing that “[p]laintiff’s counsel often overstate the amount
to which their client is entitled, and indeed have little incentive for restraint”).
400. Id. (opining that “the amount demanded cannot automatically be the
number from which the savings . . . can reasonably be calculated”); D.C. Bar, Le-
gal Ethics Comm., Op. 347, at 3 (2009) (asserting that “[t]he amount demanded
by an adversary may not be taken alone as the basis for a reverse contingent
fee”).
       
 
         
        
        
   
        
        
      
        
        
          
       
      
       
         
      
          
       
         
       
           
         
           
          
             
         
 
             
   
              
              
       
            
 
          
             
       
              
     
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 987
specifically plead damages in a complaint or petition,401 but
must instead assert a jurisdictional amount or plead
entitlement to damages that “are fair and reasonable” or that
are “just and proper.”402 
In short, in any case where the amount or value of the
plaintiff’s claim is unspecified, the lawyer and client must
negotiate a fair dollar figure to assign to the plaintiff’s claim.
The selection of this number “should be the product of full
disclosure by the lawyer and informed consent from the
client. The lawyer may not suggest a number based upon an
assessment of the matter or experience in the particular type
of dispute that is not disclosed to the client.”403 
It is easy to imagine a scenario in which the simplistic
valuation of a plaintiff’s claim could spawn a dispute over the 
reasonableness of a reverse contingent fee. Assume that
Company C engages Law Firm L to defend it in commercial
litigation. The plaintiff’s detailed complaint concludes with a
prayer for damages of $15 million, which the defense lawyers
consider plausible given the allegations. L agrees to accept
as its fee one-third of any amount it saves C off the plaintiff’s
prayer. L wins the case on summary judgment and presents
C with a $5 million bill. Always cost-conscious, C asks how
much time L spent in winning the case. When L reveals that
it has 1000 hours invested in the matter, C is upset that L is
effectively charging $5,000 per hour.404 In response, C offers
401. ABA Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-373,
at 4 (1993).
402. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 509.050.1(2) (2015) (“If a recovery of money be 
demanded [in a pleading that sets forth a claim for relief], no dollar amount or
figure shall be included in the demand except to determine the proper jurisdic-
tional authority, but the prayer shall be for such damages as are fair and reason-
able.”).
403. D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 347, at 3 (2009).
404. See Donald P. Butler & Roger D. Townsend, Focusing on Litigation Re-
sults: The Role of the Case Manager, ACC DOCKET, Mar. 2006, at 22, 24 (warning
that reverse contingent fees “may result in a huge payout at the end of the day,
which management may later resent”), http://www.adjtlaw.com/assets/ACC%20 
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to pay L its lawyers’ full hourly rates for the 1000 hours spent
on the case. When L politely insists on payment in
accordance with the fee agreement, C weighs its options. C
knows from working with other law firms in the city that
average hourly rates for partners range between $400 and
$600. Armed with this knowledge, C sends L a check for
$600,000, representing 1000 hours at $600 per hour. Can C
escape its reverse contingent fee agreement on the basis that
L’s fee is unreasonable and the law is clear that clients 
cannot consent to unreasonable fees? Wunschel Law Firm,
P.C. v. Clabaugh405 suggests that the answer may be yes.
The defendant in Wunschel, Larry Clabaugh, was sued
in an Iowa state court and asked Russell Wunschel to 
represent him.406 Wunschel proposed a fee of $50 per hour,
secured by a $1000 retainer.407 Clabaugh asked whether an
alternative fee arrangement was possible and Wunschel
proposed a reverse contingent fee of one-third of any amount
saved off the plaintiff’s $17,500 prayer for damages, again
coupled with a $1000 retainer.408 When Clabaugh asked
which fee arrangement would cost more, Wunschel
hesitatingly said that the reverse contingent fee agreement
might be more expensive.409 Clabaugh accepted the reverse
contingent fee agreement and paid the retainer.410 
The case went to trial and the jury returned a $1750
verdict against Clabaugh.411 Wunschel subsequently billed
Clabaugh $4270, representing a contingent fee of $5250
Docket%20article%20Managing%20Litigation—Role%20of%20Case%20Man-
ager.pdf.
405. 291 N.W.2d 331 (Iowa 1980).






       
 
         
         
        
      
     
        
      
        
       
     
        
       
     
      
        
    
        
           
           
          
         
  
 
     
        
           
        
        
           
        
          
           
        
 
   
   
   
   
   
         
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 989
calculated as agreed, less the $1000 retainer, plus costs of
$20.412 Clabaugh refused to pay and Wunschel sued him to
collect the fees and costs.413 Wunschel prevailed in the trial
court and Clabaugh appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court.414 
The Iowa Supreme Court framed the question presented
as whether it should “approve contingent attorney fee
contracts for the defense of unliquidated tort damage claims
in which the fee is fixed as a percentage of the difference 
between the amount prayed for in the petition and the 
amount actually awarded.”415 Recognizing the question’s
ethical overtones, the court requested an amicus brief from
the Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa
State Bar Association.416 The Committee saw many problems
with reverse contingent fees based on the difference between
the plaintiff’s prayer and any verdict in cases with
unliquidated damages.417 In summary:
[A] contingent fee arrangement in the defense of an unliquidated
tort claim has missing the critical factor that the amount against
which the percentage is taken is determined, at a later date, by an
independent party or by agreement of the client. Also, the lawyer
does not have to establish liability (or lack thereof) to be entitled to 
a fee.
The Committee therefore believes that since these critical
factors are missing from a defense-contingent fee arrangement in
an unliquidated tort action, that such fee is based upon pure
speculation. A fee based purely upon speculation cannot be 
reasonable as required by [Iowa ethics rules]. The Committee is
unanimous in its decision that in a tort action claiming unliquidated
damages, a defense contingent fee based upon a percentage of the
difference between the prayer in the plaintiff’s petition and the
jury’s verdict is improper. Its decision is the same even if the actual






417. See id. at 335–36 (quoting the Committee’s brief).
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in the case at bar) so that the fee would not increase if the prayer is
increased.418 
The court adopted the Committee’s position.419 It agreed
that a contingent fee agreement is unreasonable where the
fee will be determined using factors that are logically
unrelated to the value of the lawyer’s services.420 This was
such a case.421 The Wunschel court thus reversed the trial
court and held that “a contingent fee contract for the defense 
of an unliquidated tort damage claim which is based upon a
percentage of the difference between the prayer of the
petition and the amount awarded is void.”422 
The court did not decide whether Wunschel’s fee was
reasonable or not; it simply held that contracts of this type
were “likely to result in unreasonable fees in too many cases
and thus are contrary to sound public policy.”423 The court
further held that because the fee agreement was “not invalid
because of illegality of the services but merely because on
policy grounds” it could not “approve the way in which the
fee was to be calculated,” Wunschel was entitled on remand
to recover a reasonable fee from Clabaugh in quantum
meruit.424 
Some lawyers might argue that the Wunschel court
erred. The selection of any figure on which to base a reverse
contingent fee is subjective. Any prediction of verdict value
is to some extent speculative. Even comparisons to analogous
cases based on published reports of verdicts or settlements
are imperfect because such summaries cannot capture the 
factors necessary to truly evaluate a case. Thus, it was
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proper for Wunschel to calculate his fee based on the 
damages sought in the petition.
The trouble with that argument is the apparent lack of
evidence in the record that Wunschel tried to calculate a
logical basis for his fee and settled on the pleaded damages
because that was the best he could do. It is therefore
impossible to rule out the prospect that he knew the case was
worth less than the $17,500 set forth in the plaintiff’s
petition. But even if his approach was legitimate, he never
explained to Clabaugh the reasoning behind his fee 
calculation. Clients need adequate information to participate
intelligently in decisions concerning their legal affairs,
including the fees they are to be charged,425 and Wunschel
never provided Clabaugh with such information.
Brown & Sturm v. Frederick Road Limited
Partnership426 is another illustrative case. Brown & Sturm
centered on the conduct of two experienced Maryland
lawyers, Edwin Brown and Rex Sturm.427 Through their
firm, they represented the children of Lawson and Cordelia
King, who had bought their parents’ farm and incurred
massive tax liability when their parents died.428 Brown &
Sturm had represented the King family in connection with
the sale.429 In a nutshell, the children were in a pinch after
the IRS assessed liability for estate and gift taxes, along with
fraud and under-valuation penalties, in the amount of $68
million.430 The assessments were based on the IRS’s
determination that the children had purchased the farm at a
price far below its fair market value of $60 million for
425. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
426. 768 A.2d 62 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001).
427. See id. at 66 (explaining that at relevant times they had practiced for a
combined 87 years).
428. Id. at 65, 67–70.
429. Id. at 67–70.
430. Id. at 69–70.
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development use (its highest and best use, rather than its
agricultural value).431 After agreeing to represent the
children “in all Tax Matters” concerning their parents’
estate,432 Brown and Sturm negotiated with the children
over a fee for the tax deficiency case.433 The negotiations
spanned months, even as the firm actively represented the 
children.434 Finally, the firm and the children agreed that the
“fee would be ten percent of any savings achieved in the tax
liability and fraud and under-valuation penalties,” and five
percent of any reduction in the fraud penalties, all measured
from the amounts the IRS claimed.435 
The tax litigation proceeded and Brown obtained three 
objectively reasonable appraisals of the farm, ranging from
$4.9 million to $10.4 million.436 An IRS appraiser valued the
farm at around $36.5 million.437 Ultimately, the King
children accepted a $20 million valuation and the IRS waived
all penalties and other claims.438 The children’s liability
approached $20 million.439 Brown & Sturm’s reverse
contingent fee was a little over $4.8 million.440 
The King children attempted to sell the farm to a real
estate developer, but a soft market thwarted their efforts.441 
Eventually, the tax bill, legal fees, and soft real estate
market forced one of the children and the farming
431. Id. (the children actually paid $248,100 for the property).
432. Id. at 70.
433. Id. at 70–71.
434. Id. at 70
435. Id. at 71.
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partnership the children formed into bankruptcy.442 Brown
& Sturm made a claim for its fee in the bankruptcy, but the 
bankruptcy court disallowed it as excessive.443 The firm then
sued to collect its fee in a Maryland state court.444 The trial
court found for the children and the firm appealed.445 
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court,
noting that Brown & Sturm’s reverse contingent fee was
based on what it knew to be an obscene appraisal of the farm
by the government.446 The Brown & Sturm court agreed with
the trial court that “Brown & Sturm failed to disclose to the
family . . . a more realistic worst-case market value of the
farm . . . and that information would have significantly
reduced the amount agreed upon as a benchmark for tax
liability in the retainer agreement.”447 In fact, Brown knew
long before the parties agreed on the fee that the state and
county had appraised the farm’s value at $9.75 million and
$24.8 million, respectively.448 
In addition to skewering the firm on the disclosure issue,
the trial court was able to conclude based on this evidence 
and expert testimony presented by the children that the 
IRS’s $60 million valuation figure that Brown & Sturm used
to calculate its fee was “unreasonably high.”449 Indeed, no
other conclusion was possible. Brown & Sturm’s practice
focused on land valuation, both Brown and Sturm had
substantial experience in the area, and they knew from the 
state and county appraisals of the farm that the IRS’s
442. Id. at 72–73.
443. Id. at 73.
444. See id. at 65.
445. Id. at 65–66.
446. See id. at 76.
447. Id. at 76–77.
448. Id. at 68–69.
449. Id. at 77–78.
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estimate “in the deficiency notice was unrealistic.”450 Even if
Brown and Sturm had not known that the IRS’s valuation
was excessive, they had a duty to “research the matter
carefully before holding out $60 million as a benchmark
figure.”451 
Maryland courts measure the reasonableness of
contingent fees at two points. First, the contingent fee
agreement must be reasonable in principle when the parties
enter into it.452 Second, after the contingency has been met
and the fee quantified, the fee must be reasonable in
operation as measured by the factors in Rule 1.5(a).453 
Here, the reverse contingent fee agreement was
unreasonable at the outset of the representation because 
Brown and Sturm failed to advise the children regarding
their reasonable IRS deficiency exposure.454 Instead, they
“based the fee agreement upon the government’s inflated
claim, which in turn, unreasonably inflated the potential
fee.”455 As for the reasonableness of the fee in operation,
suffice it to say that Brown & Sturm could not satisfy any of
the Rule 1.5(a) factors.456 In summary, the Brown & Sturm
court affirmed the trial court judgment, concluding that
Brown & Sturm’s reverse contingent fee “was unreasonable 
because it bore little relation to the time, labor, novelty and
450. Id. at 78.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 79.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 80. Brown testified that he always thought the government’s valu-
ation of the King farm was too high, that the county and state appraisals sup-
ported a far lower valuation, and that he knew the Tax Court favored compromise
and generally “split the difference” between the government’s and the taxpayers’
valuations. Id. Sturm had once written a letter stating that he and Brown be-
lieved they could convince the Tax Court to accept a $5 million valuation of the
King farm. Id.
456. Id. at 80–81.
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risk of the legal problem.”457 
Brown & Sturm highlights the importance to lawyers of
fully disclosing relevant knowledge and information when
negotiating with a client over the base figure for calculating
a reverse contingent fee. The case also establishes that in
selecting a base figure, lawyers must undertake the analysis,
investigation, or research necessary to establish the 
reasonableness of the figure they propose.
B. Recommendations for Lawyers 
If lawyers intend to propose reverse contingent fees to
clients, they should take some precautions.458 First, lawyers
must carefully select the benchmark figure on which to base
the client’s savings and thus their fee. Only in liquidated
damage cases can this number be based exclusively on the 
damages claimed in the plaintiff’s complaint or petition.459 
Where the plaintiff’s damages are unliquidated, the use of
the damages alleged by the plaintiff as the sole basis for the
benchmark figure is improper.460 The unreliability of the
plaintiff’s pleaded damages—including their susceptibility to 
exaggeration or inflation—mandates independent
evaluation by the defense lawyer in setting a reasonable
benchmark.461 In some cases, a lawyer may have sufficient
experience and knowledge to set the benchmark. In other
cases, the lawyer may have to research comparable cases to 
457. Id. at 81.
458. Before deciding how to calculate a reverse contingent fee, a lawyer must
consider whether it is even reasonable to charge such a fee in light of the Model
Rule 1.5(a) factors. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2017). If it is not, and the lawyer still wishes to undertake the representation,
she will have to offer the client an alternative fee. ABA Comm. on Legal Ethics
& Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-373, at 6 (1993).
459. Iowa Supreme Court Bd. Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, Op. 98-03 (1998).
460. D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 347, at 2, 6 (2009).
461. See ABA Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-
373, at 4–5 (1993); D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 347, at 2 (2009).
      
 
       
        
      
    
      
        
        
         
    
       
   
       
     
        
        
         
    
        
      
       
    
   
      
         
      
       
      
 
            
             
             
      
            
   
   
996 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
identify a reasonable figure. Regardless of how lawyers
arrive at benchmark figures, they should fully explain their
reasoning to their clients.462 They should also recite their
reasoning in their fee agreements.
Second, lawyers must practice full disclosure when
proposing or agreeing to a reverse contingent fee.463 As noted
above, they should explain their reasoning for recommending
or insisting upon a benchmark figure. Lawyers must also
explain the percentage to be applied to the potential savings.
In contrast to typical contingent fee arrangements, “there
are no established norms concerning the appropriate 
percentages for a lawyer to” apply to reverse contingent
fees.464 To demonstrate the reasonableness of a particular
percentage, a lawyer may wish to compare for the client the
range of fees that might reasonably be charged if the lawyer
bills by the hour as compared to the range of fees that a
reverse contingent fee agreement might yield.465 
It seems obvious that the type and amount of disclosure
required will vary with the client’s sophistication.
Sophisticated clients, such as corporations with in-house law
departments—who often insist upon and negotiate 
alternative billing arrangements—generally should require 
less disclosure than individuals.466 That said, the possibility
that a sophisticated client will chafe at what it considers to 
be an outsized reverse contingent fee should suggest to
lawyers the need to ensure that any client fully understands
all aspects of a reverse contingent fee agreement.
VI. THE CONSEQUENCES OF PREMATURE TERMINATION OF THE 
462. D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 347, at 3 (2009).
463. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“A
lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”).
464. D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 347, at 3 (2009).
465. Id.
466. Id.
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ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IN A CONTINGENT FEE 
REPRESENTATION 
Finally, there is the issue of lawyers’ compensation in
cases where the attorney-client relationship is terminated
before the occurrence of the contingency on which the parties’
fee agreement is based. By way of background, once a client
retains a lawyer to handle a matter, the attorney-client
relationship continues as long as the lawyer remains
responsible for the matter because she has accepted
responsibility to bring the matter to a successful
conclusion.467 Or, phrased a bit differently, the attorney-
client relationship continues until the lawyer accomplishes
the purpose for which the representation was initially
formed.468 But the client and the lawyer are not necessarily
shackled together until the end. The client may discharge the 
lawyer at any time for any reason, or for no reason.469 To
protect the client’s ability to terminate the attorney-client
relationship, the law implies in every fee agreement the 
client’s right to terminate the contract without incurring
liability for breach.470 On the other side of the coin, the
lawyer may withdraw from the client’s representation for a
number of valid reasons.471 In either case, the lawyer’s right
467. Nat’l Med. Care, Inc. v. Home Med. of Am., Inc., No. 00-1225, 2002 WL
31068413, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 2002); see also Berry v. McFarland,
278 P.3d 407, 411 (Idaho 2012) (“If the attorney agrees to undertake a specific
matter, the relationship terminates when that matter has been resolved.”); W.
Wagner & G. Wagner Co. v. Block, 669 N.E.2d 272, 275–76 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995)
(“It is generally held that when an attorney agrees to represent a client it is im-
plied that he agrees to see the matter through to its conclusion.”).
468. Revise Clothing, Inc. v. Joe’s Jeans Subsidiary, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 2d 381,
389–90 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting 48 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 18).
469. Nabi v. Sells, 892 N.Y.S.2d 41, 43 (App. Div. 2009); MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
470. Golightly v. Gassner, 2009 WL 1470342, at *2 (Nev. Feb. 26, 2009).
471. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(a) & (b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)
(listing the grounds for terminating a representation).
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to compensation for her services is a concern.472 
Regardless of whether the client discharges the lawyer
or the lawyer withdraws from the representation, the 
lawyer’s right to compensation for services rendered up to 
that point, if any, will generally lie in quantum meruit.473 
Resort to quantum meruit is necessary because the client’s
discharge of the lawyer and the lawyer’s withdrawal from the 
representation each terminate the contingent fee contract
and thus eliminate it as a basis for calculating the lawyer’s
compensation.474 Quantum meruit is an equitable theory of
recovery designed to prevent a party from being unjustly
enriched in the absence of an agreement to pay for services
rendered.475 Under quantum meruit, a court “is literally to
award the lawyer ‘as much as he deserves.’”476 This principle
recognizes that while a client always has the right to 
discharge her lawyer at any time and for any reason, she
does not necessarily have the right to avoid paying the fees
the lawyer has earned up to that point.
Understandably, for a lawyer originally retained under
472. If a client discharges a lawyer who is working for a contingent fee after
the contingency has occurred, the attorney can rely on the fee agreement to re-
cover her fee. Cooper v. Ford & Sinclair, P.A., 888 So. 2d 683, 690 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004); Pa. Ethics Op. 94-59, 1994 WL 928037, at *1 (Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm.
Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility 1994). Indeed, in that instance, the lawyer
cannot recover in quantum meruit because she has a contractual basis for recov-
ery. McCullough v. Waterside Assocs., 925 A.2d 352, 356–57 (Conn. App. Ct.
2007); Garnick & Scudder, P.C. v. Dolinsky, 701 N.E.2d 357, 359 (Mass. App. Ct.
1998).
473. See Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v. Hannon Law Firm, L.L.C., 2012
CO 61, ¶ 19, 287 P.3d 842, 847 (2012) (“Quantum meruit allows a party to recover
the reasonable value of the services provided when the parties either have no 
express contract or have abrogated it.”).
474. See Thompson v. Buncik, 2011 IL App (2d) 100589, ¶ 8, 961 N.E.2d 280,
283 (referring to the client’s discharge of the lawyer); Bradley v. Estate of Lester,
355 S.W.3d 470, 472 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011) (referring to the lawyer’s withdrawal).
475. In re Gilbert, 2015 CO 22, ¶ 21, 346 P.3d 1018, 1023; Melat, Pressman &
Higbie, L.L.P., 2012 CO 61, ¶ 19, 287 P.3d at 847.
476. Thompson, 2011 IL App (2d) 100589, ¶ 8, 961 N.E.2d at 283 (quoting
Wegner v. Arnold, 713 N.E.2d 247, 250 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)).
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a contingent fee agreement to recover in quantum meruit, 
the client must recover in the underlying lawsuit,477 and the
parties’ contingent fee agreement must contemplate that
form of recovery.478 Absent the occurrence of the contingency
at the heart of the parties’ fee agreement, the client received
no benefit from the lawyer’s services.479 
A lawyer asserting a right to recover fees in quantum
meruit bears the burden of proving the reasonable value of
the services provided before her discharge or withdrawal.480 
A lawyer seeking quantum meruit damages generally must
establish the number of hours she worked on the matter and
her reasonable hourly rate, as well as any other evidence 
tending to prove the reasonable value of her services.481 
Thus, even though a lawyer charging a contingent fee
obviously is not billing by the hour, she still should record all
time spent on the matter.482 Although contemporaneous time
records are not required for lawyers to recover the reasonable
value of their services in quantum meruit,483 lawyers who do
477. Salzman v. Reyes, 198 So. 3d 1068, 1069 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (quot-
ing Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1021, 22 (Fla. 1982)); Culpepper & Car-
roll, PLLC v. Cole, 2005-1136, p. 5 n.4 (La. 4/6/06); 929 So. 2d 1224, 1228 n.4; Liss
v. Studeny, 879 N.E.2d 676, 682 (Mass. 2008); Pritchett & Burch, PLLC v. Boyd,
609 S.E.2d 439, 444 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); Reid, Johnson, Downes, Andrachik &
Webster v. Lansberry, 629 N.E.2d 431, 436 (Ohio 1994); Martinez v. Martinez,
2010 OK CIV APP 141, ¶ 3, 245 P.3d 618, 619 (2010).
478. See, e.g., In re Diviacchi, 62 N.E.3d 38, 45 (Mass. 2016) (reasoning that
the lawyer’s claimed contingent fee was unreasonable under Rule 1.5(a) where 
the former client’s recovery came from a transaction with which the lawyer did
not assist and which the fee agreement did not cover).
479. Martinez, 2010 OK CIV APP 141, ¶ 5, 245 P.3d at 619.
480. White v. Beelman River Terminals, Inc., 2016 Ill. App. (5th) 140175-U, ¶
24, 2016 WL 2909188, at *6 (May 17, 2016); McCoy v. The Hershewe Law Firm,
P.C., 366 S.W.3d 586, 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012); Bass v. Rose, 609 S.E.2d 848, 853
(W. Va. 2004).
481. Eichholz Law Firm, P.C. v. Tate Law Grp., LLC, 783 S.E.2d 466, 468 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Overman v. All Cities Transfer Co., 336 S.E.2d 341, 343
(Ga. Ct. App. 1985)).
482. Bass, 609 S.E.2d at 853.
483. Mardirossian & Assocs., Inc. v. Ersoff, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 665, 675 (Ct. App.
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not effectively document their efforts on clients’ behalf risk
the inability to persuade a court of the correct fee award.484 
A lawyer’s inability to prove the reasonable value of her
services is fatal to a quantum meruit claim.485 
A lawyer’s right to compensation in quantum meruit is
not defeated by language in the contingent fee agreement to 
the effect of “no recovery[,] no fee.”486 Such provisions are
meant to apply where the lawyer sees the matter through to
completion but the client recovers nothing through
settlement or judgment.487 
A. Lawyers’ Right to Compensation When Clients 
Prematurely Terminate Contingent Fee Representations 
A lawyer earns a contingent fee when a judgment is
recovered or a settlement is paid.488 If the client terminates
the attorney-client relationship sooner, for purposes of
compensating the lawyer it is necessary to know whether the 
client fired the lawyer for cause or without cause.
There is no “bright-line” test for determining whether a
client discharged a lawyer for cause.489 “Cause” is not
2007).
484. Bass, 609 S.E.2d at 853.
485. McCoy, 366 S.W.3d at 597.
486. Capek v. Devito, 767 A.2d 1047, 1050 (Pa. 2001).
487. Id.
488. Nunn Law Office v. Rosenthal, 905 N.E.2d 513, 519 n.9 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009). If a settlement will be paid in installments, the lawyer should collect her
fee as the settlement payments are received, absent contrary language in the 
parties’ contingent fee agreement. In re Hailey, 792 N.E.2d 851, 861 (Ind. 2003);
In re Stochel, 792 N.E.2d 874, 876 (Ind. 2003); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 35 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (discussing con-
tingent fees in connection with structured settlements). Assuming that a fee is
otherwise reasonable, a lawyer may state in her contingent fee agreement that
she will receive her full fee from an initial settlement payment. McNamara v.
O’Donnell Haddad LLC, 2016 IL App (2d) 150519-U, ¶¶ 16–17, 2016 WL 769754,
at *4–5 (Feb. 26, 2016).
489. Harrill & Sutter, PLLC v. Kosin, 2011 Ark. 51, at 11, 378 S.W.3d 135, 142.
       
 
       
       
       
       
     
      
         
         
       
        
        
        
       
        
     
   
       
         
        
     
 
             
  
              
          
            
             
               
  
             
             
     
              
           
        
           
             
             
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 1001
restricted to conduct by the lawyer that merits professional
discipline or exposes the lawyer to civil liability.490 It also
encompasses “other conduct that would cause a reasonable
client to discharge the lawyer,” such as conduct that causes
the client to seriously doubt the lawyer’s competence,
diligence, or willingness to communicate concerning the
matter, even if the lawyer’s behavior does not harm the
client.491 A client’s loss of “absolute confidence” in a lawyer
may satisfy the cause requirement.492 As a general rule,
however, a client’s dissatisfaction with a lawyer’s reasonable
strategic choices is not cause for discharging the lawyer,493 
nor is a client’s general unhappiness with the lawyer’s
services.494 The determination that a client discharged a
lawyer for cause must be based on an objective analysis of
the lawyer’s conduct and the client’s rationale for
terminating the attorney-client relationship.495 
In some jurisdictions, a lawyer who is discharged for
cause is entitled to recover no fee.496 In other jurisdictions, a
lawyer who is discharged for cause is entitled to no fee if the
“cause” is “disciplinable misconduct prejudicial to the client’s
490. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 40 cmt. c (AM.
LAW INST. 2000).
491. See id. (referring to doubts about the lawyer’s competence as an example);
see also Murrey v. Shank, C.A. No. 07C-08-137 CLS, 2011 WL 4730549, at *3 
(Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 2011) (referring to Delaware ethics rules, and stating
that a lawyer’s lack of diligence, failure to keep the client informed about the 
status of the matter, and failure to return the client’s calls would be cause for
discharging the lawyer).
492. Rose v. Welch, 115 S.W.3d 478, 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
493. Steinhoff v. Bayoumi, 32 N.Y.S.3d 776, 776 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Cal-
laghan v. Callaghan, 852 N.Y.S.2d 273, 275 (App. Div. 2008)).
494. Doviak v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 21 N.Y.S.3d 754, 757 (App. Div. 2015)
(quoting Wiggins v. Kopko, 962 N.Y.S.2d 776, 778 (App. Div. 2013)).
495. Wiggins, 962 N.Y.S.2d at 779; Rose, 115 S.W.3d at 487.
496. See, e.g., King & King, Chartered v. Harbert Int’l, 503 F.3d 153, 157 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007) (applying District of Columbia law); Martinez v. Mintz Law Firm, LLC,
2016 CO 43, ¶ 39, 371 P.3d 671, 677 (en banc); Callaghan, 852 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
      
 
        
      
         
      
      
      
       
  
        
         
       
 
             
               
             
            
          
          
           
             
        
               
              
             
               
               
            
                
              
                
              
            
              
               
              
              
              
             
               
                 
                
              
            
1002 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
case or conduct contrary to public policy.”497 In other words,
only serious misconduct constitutes cause sufficient to deny
the lawyer a fee altogether.498 Still other courts permit a
lawyer who is discharged for cause to invoke quantum meruit
to recover the reasonable value of services provided prior to
her termination.499 Under the first two approaches, the
existence of cause sufficient to deny the lawyer a fee is a case-
specific inquiry.
When a client discharges a lawyer without cause, the 
lawyer is entitled to recover in quantum meruit for the
reasonable value of her services rendered beforehand.500 The
497. Polen v. Reynolds, 564 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
498. See Scamardella v. Illiano, 727 A.2d 421, 430 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999)
(explaining that a lawyer who is discharged for serious misconduct is entitled to
no compensation, but if the cause is only the client’s good faith dissatisfaction
with the representation, the lawyer is entitled to reasonable compensation);
Polen, 564 N.W.2d at 470–71 (recognizing the existence of “‘in-between’ situations
in which a client terminates an attorney-client relationship for reasons that con-
tain some justification but in which the attorney has not engaged in misconduct
that makes it inappropriate to award quantum meruit recovery.”).
499. Harrill & Sutter, PLLC, 2011 Ark. 51, at 11, 378 S.W.3d 135, 142;
Duchrow v. Forrest, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 194, 212 (Ct. App. 2013); Campbell v. Bo-
zeman Inv’rs of Duluth, 1998 MT 204, ¶ 30, 964 P.2d 41, 45.
500. Triplett v. Elliott, 590 So. 2d 908, 910 (Ala. 1991); Duchrow, 156 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 212; Murrey v. Shank, C.A. No. 07C-08-137 CLS, 2011 WL 4730549, at *3
(Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 2011); Fid. Warranty Servs., Inc. v. Firstate Ins. Hold-
ings, Inc., 98 So. 3d 672, 675 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Tolson v. Sistrunk, 772
S.E.2d 416, 423 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015); Thompson v. Buncik, 2011 IL App (2d)
100589, ¶ 8, 961 N.E.2d 280, 283; I.A.E., Inc. v. Hall, 49 N.E.3d 138, 155–56 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Galanis v. Lyons & Truitt, 715 N.E.2d 858, 861 (Ind.
1999)); Phil Watson, P.C. v. Peterson, 650 N.W.2d 562, 567 (Iowa 2002); Sham-
berg, Johnson & Bergman, Chtd. v. Oliver, 220 P.3d 333, 341 (Kan. 2009); Bank
of Am., N.A. v. Prestige Imps., 54 N.E.3d 589, 596 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016) (quoting
In re Discipline of an Att’y, 884 N.E.2d 450, 460 (Mass. 2008)); McCoy v.
Hershewe Law Firm, P.C., 366 S.W.3d 586, 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012); Golightly v.
Gassner, No. 50212, 2009 WL 1470342, at *2 (Nev. Feb. 26, 2009); Steinhoff v.
Bayoumi, 32 N.Y.S.3d 776, 776 (App. Div. 2016); Crumley & Assocs., P.C. v.
Charles Peed & Assocs., P.A., 730 S.E.2d 763, 766 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012); Self &
Assocs., Inc. v. Jackson, 2011 OK CIV APP 126, ¶ 12, 269 P.3d 30, 33; Angino &
Rovner v. Jeffrey R. Lessin & Assocs., 2016 PA Super 2, 131 A.3d 502, 508; Law
Firm of Thomas A. Tarro v. Checrallah, 60 A.3d 598, 602 (R.I. 2013); Robbins v.
Legacy Health Sys., Inc., 311 P.3d 96, 103 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
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value of the lawyer’s services is a question of fact.501 The
reasonable value of the lawyer’s services is ordinarily
calculated by multiplying the number of hours the lawyer
devoted to the matter before being discharged by a
reasonable hourly rate in the locality, which is a basic
lodestar calculation.502 But a lodestar calculation is only a
starting point, because a court’s goal should be to fix an
award that approximates the reasonable value of the
lawyer’s services and that is fair to both parties.503 In
accomplishing this goal, a court should consider all relevant
factors—including, but not limited to, those listed in Model
Rule 1.5(a)—and assign them the weight it deems proper in
the exercise of its discretion.504 The court may take into
account the eight factors listed in Rule 1.5(a) when valuing
the lawyer’s services under any method.505 Of course, under
a traditional lodestar analysis, a court may adjust the
lodestar figure upward based on the Model Rule 1.5(a)
factors or similar considerations.506 
To make a long story short, a lawyer pursuing recovery
in quantum meruit is not limited to the value of her time 
measured on an hourly basis.507 A court should consider
501. Stueve v. Valmont Indus., 761 N.W.2d 544, 550 (Neb. 2009).
502. See, e.g., Cristini v. City of Warren, 30 F. Supp. 3d 665, 670 (E.D. Mich.
2014) (applying Michigan law).
503. Morgan & Morgan, P.A. v. Guardianship of Kean, 60 So. 3d 575, 577–78
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
504. See In re Outsidewall Tire Litig., 636 F. App’x 166, 169–70 (4th Cir. 2016)
(applying Virginia law); Morgan & Morgan, P.A., 60 So. 3d at 577–78.
505. See Stueve, 761 N.W.2d at 550.
506. See Cristini, 30 F. Supp. 3d at 670 (quoting Crawley v. Schick, 211 N.W.2d
217, 222 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973)).
507. See Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, P.A. v. Poletz, 652 So.
2d 366, 368–69 (Fla. 1995) (stating that a court “must consider all relevant factors
surrounding the professional relationship to ensure that [a quantm meruit]
award is fair to both the attorney and client.”); Biagioni v. Narrows MRI & Diag-
nostic Radiology, P.C., 6 N.Y.S.3d 588, 590 (App. Div. 2015) (recognizing that a
quantum meruit award “can also be calculated as a portion of a contingent fee.”).
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additional factors in deciding on an appropriate fee so that
the result is fair to the lawyer and the client given the
totality of the circumstances. These factors may include the 
contingent nature of the lawyer’s fee.508 A court may award
a fee lower than the lawyer seeks.509 A court may also award
a fee higher than the lawyer requests.510 However, as a
general rule a lawyer may not recover more than the
contingent fee she would have earned had the client not
discharged her.511 
Although a lawyer discharged before the occurrence of
the contingency on which her contingent fee agreement is
based is normally limited to recovery in quantum meruit for
the reasonable value of her legal services, courts recognize a
substantial performance exception to this rule.512 Under this
exception, when a client discharges a lawyer after the lawyer
has “substantially performed the duties owed to the client,
508. Consolver v. Hotze, 395 P.3d 405, 412–13 (Kan. 2017) (stating in reaching
this conclusion that other courts have described this approach as “quasi-quantum
meruit”).
509. See Int’l Materials Corp. v. Sun Corp., 824 S.W.2d 890, 895 (Mo. 1992) (en
banc) (“An unjust enrichment quantum in a case may be nothing if the actual
value to the client was none.”); see, e.g., In re Estate of Leichman, 2016-Ohio-
4592, 66 N.E.3d 1162, at ¶ 2, ¶ 32 (limiting the lawyer’s recovery to the $500
retainer already paid).
510. See, e.g., Angino & Rovner v. Jeffrey R. Lessin & Assocs., 2106 PA Super
2, 131 A.3d 502, 511 (stating that the facts compelled “more than an hours and
expenses quantum meruit recovery”).
511. Law Offices of J.E. Losavio, Jr. v. Law Firm of Michael W. McDivitt, P.C.,
865 P.2d 934, 936 (Colo. App. 1993); Murrey v. Shank, C.A. No. 07C-08-137 CLS,
2011 WL 4730549, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 2011); Ruby & Assocs., P.C. v.
George W. Smith & Co., P.C., No. 297266, 2011 WL 4580594, at *14–16 (Mich.
Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2011) (per curiam); Reid, Johnson, Downes, Andrachik & Webster
v. Lansberry, 629 N.E.2d 431, 436 (Ohio 1994).
512. King & King, Chtd. v. Harbert Int’l, Inc., 503 F.3d 153, 156 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (applying D.C. law); Law Firm of Thomas A. Tarro v. Checrallah, 60 A.3d
598, 602 (R.I. 2013); Goncharuk v. Barrong, 133 P.3d 510, 512 (Wash. Ct. App.
2006).
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and only ‘minor and relatively unimportant deviations
remain to accomplish full contractual performance,’” the
lawyer is entitled to receive her entire contingent fee.513 
However, for the lawyer to recover her entire contingent fee,
that fee must still be reasonable according to the same 
factors that the court would apply in any other case.514 An
underlying question is whether the full fee is awarded as
breach of contract damages on the theory that such an award
is necessary for the lawyer to realize the benefit of her
bargain, or whether the lawyer’s substantial performance 
makes the full fee a proper award calculated under quantum
meruit, but the answer to that question is more theoretical
than practical.515 Whether a lawyer has substantially
performed under a contingent fee agreement is a question of
fact.516 
Recognizing clients’ right to discharge them at any time,
lawyers understandably may want to protect their financial
513. Tarro, 60 A.3d at 602 (quoting 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 281, at
326–27 (2017)); see also Goncharuk, 133 P.3d at 512 (explaining the substantial
performance exception the same way). Fundamental contract doctrine provides
that a party may sue for breach of contract where it can show that it substantially
performed its contractual obligations. RM Campbell Indus. v. Midwest Renewa-
ble Energy, LLC, 886 N.W.2d 240, 254 (Neb. 2016) (footnotes omitted). “To estab-
lish substantial performance under a contract, any deviations from the contract
must be relatively minor and unimportant.” Id.
514. Dobbs v. DePuy Orthopedics, Inc., 842 F.3d 1045, 1049–50 (7th Cir. 2016)
(applying Illinois law).
515. Compare Dobbs, 842 F.3d at 1049–50 (reasoning that a full contingent fee 
in a case of substantial performance is awarded under quantum meruit); with
Tarro, 60 A.3d at 602 (explaining that awarding a full contingent fee in cases of
substantial performance comports with the principle that a court may award
breach of contract damages to place the injured party in as good a position as if
the parties fully performed the contract, “because an attorney who has obtained
a positive outcome for his or her client based on a contingent fee agreement will
realize the expected benefit of the bargain only if the agreed-upon contingency
fee amount is paid in full”).
516. Goncharuk, 133 P.3d at 512.
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interests by including a “conversion clause” or “termination
clause” in their contingent fee agreements. Courts and ethics
authorities appear to use these terms interchangeably. A
conversion or termination clause specifies how or in what
amount the lawyer will be compensated if the client
terminates the representation before the occurrence of the
contingency on which the lawyer’s fee is based.517 In the most
common examples of their use, such a clause may provide 
that the lawyer is entitled to compensation in quantum
meruit if the client discharges the lawyer without cause, or
may specify how a quantum meruit award will be calculated
if the client prematurely discharges the lawyer.518 
An Indiana appellate court upheld what it described as
a termination clause in Four Winds, LLC v. Smith &
DeBonis, LLC.519 In that case, Bank One sued Four Winds to
foreclose on a loan that Four Winds used to finance the 
construction of an apartment complex.520 Four Winds hired
attorney Herbert Lasser to defend it and to prosecute 
517. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 544 F. App’x 255, 259 (5th Cir.
2013) (enforcing a conversion clause which provided that if the client discharged
the lawyer, the lawyer would be entitled to a fee based on any offer of settlement
outstanding, or if there was none, a reasonable fee based on the amount of time 
the lawyer spent on the case plus costs and interest).
518. See, e.g., Colo. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 100, at 4-295 (1997)
(permitting conversion clauses where the client discharges the lawyer without
cause or the lawyer withdraws from the representation for good cause, and fur-
ther stating that the parties may define “cause”); Kan. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Advisory
Ops. Comm., Op. 93-3, at 7–8 (1993) (permitting under certain circumstances the
use of a conversion clause that calculates the amount of a quantum meruit award
as a percentage of a settlement offer rather than a percentage of the eventual
recovery); N.M. St. Bar Ethics Advisory Ops. Comm., Op. 1995-2, at 2 (1995)
(opining that a contingent fee agreement may state that the lawyer is entitled to 
fees in quantum meruit if the client discharges the lawyer without cause, with
some qualifications); Va. St. Bar Ethics Couns., Legal Ethics Op. 1812, at 2 (2005)
(stating that conversion or termination clauses are permissible so long as they
otherwise comply with rules of professional conduct and do not “unreasonably
hamper the client’s absolute right to discharge his lawyer, with or without cause,
at any point in the representation”).
519. 854 N.E.2d 70 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
520. Id. at 71.
       
 
      
        
         
         
       
       
         
        
    
    
         
     
       
       
        
         
        
     
        
        
       
       
     
        
 
 
   
   
   
   
        
     
     
     
     
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 1007
counterclaims against Bank One and American Express,
which was the receiver of the complex.521 Four Winds agreed
to pay Lasser a contingent fee of forty percent of the gross
amount of any recovery.522 Four Winds later hired another
lawyer, Smith, to assist Lasser.523 The three of them then
entered into a new contingent fee agreement under which
Smith was also to be paid a contingent fee of forty percent of
the gross amount of any recovery.524 The new fee agreement
also provided: “‘if the Client discharges the Attorney, the 
Client agrees to compensate the Attorney for the reasonable 
value of the Attorney’s services rendered to the Client up to 
the time of the discharge based on the Attorney’s prevailing
hourly charge in effect at the time of termination.’”525 
Four Winds eventually discharged Lasser and Smith,
and a dispute erupted over their fees for the case against
American Express.526 Smith sued Four Winds and won a
judgment of just over $544,000 based on the termination
clause in the contingent fee agreement.527 Four Winds
appealed, and argued that under the terms of the contingent
fee agreement, Smith was owed nothing unless it recovered
from American Express.528 Smith replied that because Four
Winds fired him before any recovery against American
Express, the termination clause in the fee agreement






525. Id. at 71 (quoting the fee agreement).
526. Id. at 72.
527. Id. at 72–73.
528. Id. at 73–74.
529. Id. at 74.
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The Indiana Court of Appeals agreed with Smith.530 
Under Indiana Supreme Court precedent, termination
clauses that provide for a lawyer to be paid hourly in the
event of a pre-contingency were “presumptively enforceable,
subject to the ordinary requirement of reasonableness.”531 
The court rejected Four Winds’ argument that the 
termination clause unduly burdened its right to discharge its
lawyers, reasoning that a client may not transform its right
to discharge its lawyer without cause into a device to avoid
paying legitimate legal fees.532 In the Four Winds court’s
view, “the termination clause [did] not unduly constrain [the]
client from exercising its right to terminate its attorney; it
require[d] the client to pay for the services already
received.”533 
Courts and disciplinary authorities carefully scrutinize 
conversion or termination clauses to ensure that they do not
penalize clients for exercising their right to discharge their
lawyers.534 Hoover Slovacek LLP v. Walton535 exemplifies
this point.
In Hoover Slovacek, John Walton hired lawyer Steve 
Parrott of Hoover Slovacek LLP (Hoover) to recover unpaid
natural gas and oil royalties in exchange for a thirty percent
530. Id.
531. Id. (quoting Galanis v. Lyons & Truitt, 715 N.E.2d 858, 862 (Ind. 1999)).
532. Id. at 75 (quoting 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE
LAW OF LAWYERING § 8.22 at 8-54 to -55 (3d ed. 2003)).
533. Id.
534. See, e.g., Angino & Rovner v. Jeffrey R. Lessin & Assocs., 2016 PA Super
2, 131 A.3d 502, 508–10 (finding that a termination clause that provided for a
contingent fee in addition to quantum meruit recovery was an unenforceable pen-
alty provision); Colo. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 100, at 4-293 (1997)
(“A conversion clause is improper if it operates as a penalty upon termination and
thereby chills the client’s exercise of [the] inherent right to discharge counsel.”);
N.M. St. Bar Ethics Advisory Ops. Comm., Op. 1995-2, at 3 (1995) (“The agree-
ment should not effectively punish a client who decides to end either the relation-
ship or the litigation, both of which are rights of the client.”).
535. 206 S.W.3d 557 (Tex. 2006).
       
 
          
      
  
        
            
       
          
        
   
     
      
        
       
        
       
       
         
         
         
          
       
        
        
       
     
       
 
     
   
     
   
     
   
   
   
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 1009
contingent fee for all claims on which collection was achieved
through one trial.536 The parties’ engagement letter included
this provision:
You may terminate the Firm’s legal representation at any
time. . . . Upon termination by You, You agree to immediately pay
the Firm the then present value of the Contingent Fee described
[herein], plus all Costs then owed to the Firm, plus subsequent legal
fees [incurred to transfer the representation to another firm and
withdraw from litigation].537 
The parties’ relationship soured when Walton
authorized Parrott to settle his claims against Bass
Enterprises Production Co. (Bass) for $8.5 million and
Parrott instead made an absurd and unauthorized $58.5
million demand on Bass.538 When Bass subsequently offered
to settle for $6 million in exchange for certain concessions
from Walton, Parrott pressured Walton to accept different
terms.539 Walton fired Parrott in disgust and hired another
law firm to deal with Bass.540 By the time the second law firm
settled Walton’s claim against Bass for $900,000, Parrott had
sent Walton a bill for $1.7 million, which represented 28.66
percent of the $6 million conditional settlement offer.541 
Walton refused to pay and Hoover intervened in Walton’s
lawsuit against Bass to try to recover its fee.542 A jury
awarded Hoover $900,000, but an appellate court reversed
the judgment because it found the fee agreement to be
unconscionable as a matter of law.543 The Texas Supreme
536. Id. at 559.
537. Id.
538. Id. at 559–60.
539. Id.
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Court granted Hoover’s petition for review.544 
Under Texas law, a lawyer working for a contingent fee
who is dismissed without cause may sue in quantum meruit
or may sue to enforce her fee agreement and collect the fee
from the client’s recovery.545 The termination clause here,
however, required immediate payment of the contingent fee 
regardless of whether Walton prevailed in the litigation.546 
That feature unduly burdened Walton’s ability to change
lawyers, and the clause therefore violated public policy and
was unconscionable as a matter of law.547 The termination
clause was additionally improper because it was
“unreasonably susceptible to overreaching” and exploited
Parrott’s superior knowledge, as evidenced by its yield of a
fee that exceeded Walton’s recovery.548 
The court further concluded that the termination clause 
violated the general ban on lawyers acquiring proprietary
interests in clients’ causes of action.549 As the court
explained:
Examining the risk-sharing attributes of the parties’ contract
reveals that Hoover’s termination fee provision weighs too heavily
in favor of the attorney at the client’s expense. Specifically, it shifted
to Walton the risks that accompany both hourly fee and contingent
fee agreements while withholding their corresponding benefits. In
obligating Walton to pay a 28.66% contingent fee for any recovery
obtained by Parrott, the fee caused Walton to bear the risk that
Parrott would easily settle his claims without earning the fee. But
Walton also bore the risk inherent in an hourly fee agreement
because, if he discharged Hoover, he was obligated to pay a 28.66%
fee regardless of whether he eventually prevailed. This “heads
lawyer wins, tails client loses” provision altered [Texas law] almost
544. Id.
545. Id. at 561. In either instance, the fee must be reasonable. Id.
546. Id. at 562.
547. Id. at 563.
548. Id.
549. Id. at 564.
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2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 1011
entirely to the client’s detriment.550 
The Hoover Slovacek court also disparaged the 
termination clause because it essentially encouraged Parrott
to bait Walton into discharging him as soon as he could
firmly establish the value of Walton’s case.551 By doing so,
Parrott could avoid the contingency supporting the fee 
agreement to take on other cases and avoid the time,
expense, and uncertain outcome of any trial or appeal.552 
Finally, the termination clause was flawed because it did
not explain how the present value of the contingent fee would
be calculated.553 This failure supported a conclusion that the
contingent fee Hoover charged was unconscionable.554 
Although the court concluded that the termination
clause was unenforceable, it declined to invalidate the fee 
agreement altogether.555 Because the jury had found that
Walton discharged Parrott without cause, the court held that
Hoover was entitled to a 28.66 percent contingent fee based
on the $900,000 recovery that successor counsel achieved for
Walton, or just under $258,000.556 
When it comes to including conversion or termination
clauses in contingent fee agreements, there are obvious
extremes. A lawyer can safely state in a contingent fee 
agreement that if the client discharges her without cause 




553. Id. at 564–65.
554. Id. at 565.
555. Id.
556. Id. at 566.
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entitled to recovery in quantum meruit.557 The parties may
further attempt to define termination for cause in the 
agreement.558 At the opposite end of the spectrum, a lawyer
clearly cannot insist on a conversion or termination clause 
that effectively penalizes the client for discharging the 
lawyer. The problem is figuring out what is permissible in
the vast middle ground.
A lawyer should be able to state in a contingent fee
agreement how any quantum meruit award will be 
calculated as long as she does so clearly and the resulting fee 
is reasonable. For example, a lawyer should be able to state
that if the client discharges her, the client will compensate 
her for the reasonable value of her services rendered up to 
the time of the discharge based on her standard hourly rate 
in effect at the time of the termination.559 A lawyer might
also state that the hourly rate at which she will be
compensated will be determined by comparison to the hourly
rates of other lawyers in the locality of similar experience. A
conversion or termination clause could state that the lawyer
will receive (a) a reasonable percentage of the opponent’s last
settlement offer; or (b) a reasonable percentage of the total
recovery reduced to reflect the lawyer’s contribution to the
case in relation to the contribution of the succeeding
lawyer.560 
Lawyers should also avoid conversion or termination
clauses that provide for the payment of a flat fee in quantum
557. Colo. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 100, at 4-295 (1997); N.M. St.
Bar Ethics Advisory Ops. Comm., Op. 1995-2, at 2 (1995). In Colorado, lawyers
must provide for quantum meruit recovery in their contingent fee agreements to
be able to seek it following discharge or withdrawal. In re Gilbert, 2015 CO 22, ¶
21, 346 P.3d 1018, 1023.
558. Colo. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 100, at 4-295 (1997); N.M. St.
Bar Ethics Advisory Ops. Comm., Op. 1995-2, at 2 (1995).
559. Four Winds, LLC v. Smith & DeBonis, LLC, 854 N.E.2d 70, 71 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006).
560. Colo. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 100, at 4-296 (1997).
       
 
       
       
     
    
        
     
         
   
      
         
        
     
       
      
     
       
       
          
 
       
     
        
               
             
              
                
            
            
            
              
              
             
               
              
                
            
2017] TURNS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE KEY 1013
meruit. Such clauses are “inherently suspect” because it is
impossible to predict when during a matter the client might
discharge the lawyer, meaning that the quantum meruit fee 
would be unreasonable until the value of the lawyer’s
services matched or exceeded the amount of the flat fee.561 
The unreasonable nature of the flat fee until the value of the
lawyer’s services equaled or exceeded it in amount would
infringe the client’s right to discharge the lawyer.562 
B. Lawyers’ Right to Compensation When They Withdraw 
from Contingent Fee Representations 
While clients may discharge their lawyers at any time 
and for any reason or no reason, lawyers may also withdraw
from representations. If a lawyer withdraws from a
contingent fee representation before having fully performed
under her agreement with the client, courts generally
consider the lawyer to have breached the agreement.563 For
the lawyer to receive compensation in quantum meruit, she 
must have withdrawn for “good cause,” also described as
“just cause” or “justifiable cause.”564 A lawyer who withdraws
without good cause, on the other hand, forfeits any right to
561. Id. at 4-295 to -296.
562. Id. at 4-296.
563. Hricik, supra note 4, at 366.
564. See Lewis v. Haskell Slaughter Young & Rediker, LLC, 582 F. App’x 810,
813 (11th Cir. 2014) (predicting Alabama law); Duchrow v. Forrest, 156 Cal. Rptr.
3d 194, 212 (Ct. App. 2013); Williams v. Victim Justice, P.C., 198 So. 3d 822, 824– 
25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Faro v. Romani, 641 So. 2d 69, 71 (Fla.
1994) (defining good cause); Doman v. Stapleton, 611 S.E.2d 673, 676-77 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2005); Tucker v. Rio Optical Corp., 885 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994);
Lofton v. Fairmont Specialty Ins. Managers, 367 S.W.3d 593, 597 (Ky. 2012);
Somuah v. Flachs, 721 A.2d 680, 688 (Md. 1998); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Prestige 
Imps., Inc., 54 N.E.3d 589, 597 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016); In re Petition for Distribu-
tion of Attorney’s Fees Between Stowman Law Firm, P.A., 870 N.W.2d 755, 756,
763 (Minn. 2015); Bell & Marra, PLLC v. Sullivan, 2000 MT 206, ¶¶ 32, 34, 6
P.3d 965, 970; Dinter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 651 A.2d 1033, 1038–39 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Hartwig v. Johnsen, 2008 UT 40, ¶ 8, 190 P.3d 1242,
1244; Ausler v. Ramsey, 868 P.2d 877, 880 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
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compensation.565 
The lawyer “bears the burden of proving good cause to 
withdraw.”566 Whether good cause for withdrawal exists is
determined on a case-by-case basis.567 “Good cause” is
difficult to define in this context, but it certainly describes a
narrow set of circumstances.568 According to the Minnesota
Supreme Court, good cause generally requires a lawyer to 
show that the client has engaged in culpable conduct, the 
lawyer has not, and the client’s continued representation 
would be unethical.569 Thus, good cause may include the
reasons for mandatory withdrawal identified in Model Rule
1.16(a), and at least some of the reasons for permissive 
withdrawal listed in Model Rule 1.16(b).570 Other courts
either express the good cause standard differently or
describe it more generally. In Law Offices of Scott E. Combs
v. Dishluk,571 for example, a Michigan court stated that there
“is good cause for an attorney to withdraw from a suit if there
has been a complete breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship.”572 Massachusetts courts apply a similar
standard.573 Still other courts do not attempt to delineate the
565. Duchrow, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 212–13; Williams, 198 So. 3d at 824–25
(quoting Faro, 641 So. 2d at 71); B. Dahlenburg Bonar, P.S.C. v. Waite, Schnei-
der, Bayless & Chesley Co., L.P.A., 373 S.W.3d 419, 423 (Ky. 2012); Bank of Am.,
54 N.E.3d at 596; Bell & Marra, 2000 MT 206, ¶¶ 32, 33, 6 P.3d at 970; Dinter, 
651 A.2d at 1038.
566. Augustson v. Linea Aerea Nacional-Chile S.A., 76 F.3d 658, 663 (5th Cir.
1996) (discussing Texas law).
567. Lofton, 367 S.W.3d at 597–98; Bonar, 373 S.W.3d at 423; In re Petition for
Distribution of Attorney’s Fees, 870 N.W.2d at 765; Bell & Marra, 2000 MT 206,
¶¶ 32, 336 P.3d at 970.
568. In re Petition for Distribution of Attorney’s Fees, 870 N.W.2d at 765.
569. Id.
570. Id. (referring to MINNESOTA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(a) &
1.16(b)(2)–(3) (2015)).
571. No. 262784, 2005 WL 3190341 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2005).
572. Id. at *3.
573. See, e.g., Bank of Am., N.A. v. Prestige Imps., Inc., 54 N.E.3d 589, 596
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sort of conduct that might constitute good cause,574 
preferring to leave that determination for the facts of the
specific case.575 Ultimately, for many courts, good cause for a
lawyer’s withdrawal is like pornography: they know it when
they see it.576 
It is much easier to describe conduct or circumstances
that do not constitute good cause for withdrawal. A lawyer
who withdraws because she believes a case is meritless is not
entitled to recovery in quantum meruit.577 In that instance,
the lawyer withdrew with no expectation of payment.578 A 
lawyer’s belief that a case will be unprofitable or
insufficiently profitable is not good cause for withdrawal.579 
“Attorneys who agree to represent clients on a contingent fee 
basis must choose their cases carefully, because the law does
not allow them to easily jettison their mistakes, especially
after [a] complaint has been filed.”580 Lawyers’ disapproval
of their co-counsel’s litigation strategy does not qualify as
good cause for withdrawal.581 Certainly, a client’s
(Mass. App. Ct. 2016) (agreeing that “a breakdown of the attorney-client relation-
ship and the trust that must underlie it” constitutes good cause for withdrawal).
574. Lofton v. Fairmont Specialty Ins. Managers 367 S.W.3d 593, 597 (Ky.
2012); see Hartwig v. Johnsen, 2008 UT 40, ¶¶ 6, 8, 190 P.3d 1242, 1244.
575. Lofton, 367 S.W.3d at 598 (stating that good cause is determined on a
case-by-case basis); Hartwig, 2008 UT 40, ¶¶ 8, 190 P.3d at 1244 (“Whether good
cause exists is a fact-intensive inquiry based on the reasons for withdrawal and
the actions of the parties prior to withdrawal.”).
576. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(“I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand
to be embraced within . . . [hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it.”).
577. Rus Miliband & Smith v. Conkle & Olesten, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 612, 623 (Ct.
App. 2003).
578. Id.
579. In re Kiley, 947 N.E.2d 1, 8 (Mass. 2011); Bell & Marra, PLLC v. Sullivan,
2000 MT 206, ¶ 39, 6 P.3d 965, 971.
580. In re Kiley, 947 N.E.2d at 9.
581. B. Dahlenburg Bonar, P.S.C. v. Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley Co.,
L.P.A., 373 S.W.3d 419, 423 (Ky. 2012).
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unwillingness to settle on terms that the lawyer considers
reasonable is not good cause for withdrawal.582 
Just as it can be difficult to define good cause for
withdrawal when a lawyer is seeking recovery in quantum
meruit, it is also easy to confuse that standard with the 
standard for withdrawing from cases where compensation is
not at issue. Indeed, when lawyers move to withdraw from
cases, they often state in their motions or supporting
memoranda that there is good cause for withdrawal.583 But
what constitutes good cause for a court to permit a lawyer to
withdraw is not necessarily good cause for purposes of
compensating the lawyer in quantum meruit.584 These are
different standards.585 As the Fifth Circuit explained in
Augustson v. Linea Aerea Nacional-Chile S.A.:586 
The objectives of a hearing on cause to withdraw differ from the 
objectives of a hearing on attorney’s fees, and because of these 
differences circumstances can arise that would authorize a trial
court to permit counsel to withdraw but retain no fee. When
considering a motion to withdraw, a trial court is given broad
discretion in order to protect the best interests of the client. In such
a setting, the court generally focuses on . . . circumstances harmful
to the attorney-client relationship, and inquiry into the cause of
these circumstances is irrelevant. At a lien hearing, however, the 
focus . . . is on the cause of attorney-client problems.587 
Or, as a California court observed:
582. Lofton v. Fairmont Specialty Ins. Managers, 367 S.W.3d 593, 597 (Ky.
2012); Law Offices of Scott E. Combs v. Dishluk, No. 262784, 2005 WL 3190341,
at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2005); In re Petition for Distribution of Attorney’s
Fees Between Stowman Law Firm, P.A., 870 N.W.2d 755, 766 (Minn. 2015).
583. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(7) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)
(permitting lawyers to withdraw from representations where “other good cause
for withdrawal exists”).
584. Duchrow v. Forrest, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 194, 213 (Ct. App. 2013) (“[T]he
granting of a motion to withdraw does not ipso facto establish justifiable cause
for a quantum meruit recovery.”).
585. Lofton, 367 S.W.3d at 596.
586. 76 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 1996).
587. Id. at 664.
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The law can afford to take a relatively permissive attitude toward
withdrawals qua withdrawals. If attorney and client cannot agree,
how can they litigate together? There is no need to unequally yoke 
a union when one of the parties clearly wants out. But the right to 
recover in quantum meruit after withdrawal is a different matter,
and one on which the law takes a more rigorous approach.588 
The difference in the standards is easily understood by
example. Assume that a lawyer who agreed to represent a
plaintiff for a contingent fee finds herself at odds with the 
client over settlement. The defendant has offered $150,000
to settle, which the lawyer considers reasonable. The client,
who at the time has unrealistic expectations, will not accept
less than $1 million. Frustrated, and unwilling to persist in
the litigation and incur expenses that she may never recover,
the lawyer moves to withdraw under Model Rule 1.16(b)(6)
on the basis that the representation will impose “an
unreasonable financial burden” on her and has been
“rendered unreasonably difficult by the client.”589 If the court
grants the motion, the lawyer will be permitted to withdraw
from the case. The lawyer will not, however, be entitled to
recover any fees in quantum meruit if the client’s new lawyer
persuades the client to accept the defendant’s subsequent
take-it-or-leave-it $250,000 settlement offer. This is because 
“disagreement with a client over whether to accept a
settlement offer is not good and sufficient cause for an 
attorney to withdraw with [the] expectation of a quantum
meruit fee.”590 
Just as a lawyer may define cause in a conversion or
termination clause when providing for compensation in
quantum meruit if the client discharges her without cause, a
lawyer may in such a clause attempt to define good cause for
588. Rus Miliband & Smith v. Conkle & Olesten, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 612, 623–24
(Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis omitted).
589. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(6) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
590. Lofton, 367 S.W.3d at 597 (emphasis omitted).
      
 
          
         
       
        
 
      
       
      
        
         
         
      
          
        
       
  
      
       
       
        
      
        
       
          
 
            
          
 
            
           
         
         
            
          
           
    
1018 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
withdrawal.591 Model Rule 1.16 is obviously a good place to
start when defining withdrawal for good cause,592 although a
lawyer must be careful not to attempt to define good cause in
such a way as to impair the client’s right to control
settlement.593 
CONCLUSION 
Contingent fees have historically been predominant in
plaintiffs’ personal injury and employment litigation. And,
again historically, lawyers charging contingent fees have 
typically practiced solo or in small firms. Neither the
traditional view of the types of litigation for which lawyers
charge contingent fees nor the types of lawyers or law firms
charging them is reliably accurate today. Large and mid-
sized law firms now represent clients on a contingent fee
basis in various matters, and major corporations with
substantial resources frequently engage lawyers on a
contingent fee basis.
There are at least two reasons that contingent fees have 
spread beyond their historical realm to practice areas such
as intellectual property and commercial litigation, and are 
now charged by law firms that have traditionally eschewed
them. First, organizational clients are increasingly seeking
lawyers who will represent them on a contingency basis
because they believe that a contingent fee aligns the lawyer’s
interests with theirs. By insisting on a contingent fee, the
591. Colo. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 100, at 4-295 (1997).
592. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(2)–(6) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2017).
593. For example, withdrawal based on the client’s insistence on “taking action
that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental
disagreement” (MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2017)) or withdrawal where “the representation will result in an unreasonable
financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by
the client” (MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(6) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017))
cannot be construed to permit withdrawal for good cause where the lawyer and
client disagree on settlement.
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client also avoids the potentially significant expense 
attributable to hourly billing. Second, large law firms are 
increasingly receptive to contingent fees because some cases
are potentially much more profitable on a contingent fee 
basis than they would be if they were billed hourly.
As established, popular, or increasingly widespread as
they are, contingent fees raise numerous professional
responsibility issues. For lawyers who are not immersed in
contingent fee practice, these issues are lurking traps. Even
lawyers who have long experience with contingent fees may
occasionally stumble over unfamiliar problems. For lawyers
who charge contingent fees, ethical scrutiny is nearly 
constant because of the special attention that courts devote
to contingent fee agreements. Unfortunately, some areas,
such as the acceptable scope of conversion or termination
clauses, are difficult to navigate because of factual
differences between cases and the variable sensitivities of
courts and disciplinary authorities. This Article has
surveyed some of the more prominent professional
responsibility challenges in contingent fee representations in
an effort to help lawyers meet them. The burden remains on
lawyers, however, to be as careful and thoughtful in
structuring and managing their representations as they are
in all other aspects of their litigation practices.
